Tiananmen: growing pains of a rising nation

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Facing the facts—no massacre, but no colour revolution either

Disclaimer: the conclusions reached in this article series do not necessarily represent the editorial view of Real Left.

Why Tiananmen, why now?

Western narratives about China continue to be shaped by persistent myths surrounding the events of Tiananmen in 1989. So long as Western media and political figures continue to repeat these distortions of a pivotal moment in modern Chinese history, we must actively expose them. But we need to do this factually and honestly.

By late 2023, I grew increasingly uneasy about the relentless anti-China rhetoric cropping up everywhere—not just in mainstream media and political rhetoric but across social media and alternative news outlets as well. The propaganda continues to escalate, which is alarming for three key reasons. First, spreading lies about the lives of 1.4 billion fellow human beings isn’t just misleading—it’s morally indefensible. More pressingly, this narrative is conditioning Western populations for war.

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Beyond that, China isn’t the authoritarian monolith it’s so often painted as. These myths serve a dual purpose: they distract from the real forces attacking our living standards, suppressing free speech and criminalising resistance in our own societies while keeping public attention fixated on an external “enemy.”

I need to declare my own initial ignorance. I endeavour to keep up with geopolitics but had been duped by these very same myths myself! But several years ago, I came across an article shared on alternative social media. It debunked the Tiananmen massacre narrative. I was blown away. A layer of fog lifted and the world became clearer. Wanting to know more, I reached out to a Chinese account on X who had come into my feed. Chinese and English-speaking but Western-reared and now living in China, this person sent me sources and generously gave their time to answer my curly questions about life in China.

Initially, outraged at the incessant lies, I set out to compile a straightforward resource—a collection of links to the excellent work others had already done in dismantling the latest fabrications: Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, ‘social credit scores’, authoritarianism, supposed mass misery. Easy, right? But very quickly, I found myself bogged down in Tiananmen Square. On this one issue, the deeper I dug, the more I realised it wasn’t only the mainstream narrative that was riddled with inconsistencies—those challenging it often grasped at weak counterclaims.

Over a year of focussed research later, one thing became clear: efforts to push back against the “massacre” story lose credibility when they rely on flimsy arguments. If we’re going to challenge the dominant narrative, we need to do so with precision, not wishful thinking. I decided to write an article I could share with confidence about Tiananmen myths.

The more honest, but still misleading, anti-China Western narrative goes: “Okay, there was no massacre in Tiananmen Square, but there was one a few kilometres away.” I have concluded ‘massacre’ is not an appropriate term for what transpired a few kilometres west of the Square. Read about it briefly under Timeline in this article, and in more depth in Tiananmen Timeline.

The pro-China narrative goes: “Not only was there no massacre, there was a violent insurrection waged by thugs–oh, and it was also a Western-backed colour revolution.” I was more than open to this idea, given this was undeniably true in Hong Kong in 2019, just one case in the West’s long history of meddling in sovereign nations that don’t toe the line. So, I thought: “Great, I just need to verify the sources and put it all together.”

But as I dug deeper, it became clear that critics of the Western narrative of 1989 were seeing things that weren’t there—chasing ghosts of Western interference that, while always lurking in the background, had little real impact on what was happening on the ground.¹ Why does this matter? Because when we attribute the movement primarily to external forces, we miss the internal struggles—the genuine tensions that had been building within Chinese society, in the struggle to develop in a hostile world. We overlook the enormity of the challenges faced by the country’s leadership at the time.

That doesn’t mean the West is off the hook—far from it. The cutthroat nature of global capitalism, dominated by the West, placed immense pressure on China’s society and economy; along with empty promises that Western-style “freedoms” would smooth the pains of development and lead to a liberal-democratic utopia. But the Communist Party of China (CPC) handled it—deftly, if not flawlessly. The alternative? Look at Russia in the 1990’s.² Look at India to this day.³ China dodged a bullet.

This article is for people who want to understand the China of 1989, as well as those especially interested in U.S. foreign policy, and the speculations and ‘conspiracy theories’ of the event. To provide context, I include a very brief timeline of the movement and the ultimate crackdown, before proceeding to a brief economic and political background, followed by an outline of the social classes involved. I then finish with a discussion of the shallow evidence—the ‘smoking guns’—of the pro-China crowd who claim Tiananmen was an attempted colour revolution by the West.

Refer to Tiananmen Timeline for a more detailed account of the movement itself—a chronological narrative of the 7 week-long protest movement and its culmination in armed resistance by insurrectionists and ultimate crackdown by the state.

Forthcoming articles will include:

A collation of evidence documenting the undeniable evidence 1. that there was no massacre in the Square but, rather, pitched street battles elsewhere between urban fighters and an army acting under orders to reach and clear the Square with as few deaths as possible, and 2. that the leadership of the Communist Party of China went to great lengths to peacefully resolve the situation.

A compendium of articles that debunk anti-China propaganda—as per the original plan!

Tiananmen Timeline

As mentioned above, I wrote an extended narrative timeline in Tiananmen Timeline:⁴

April 15 – Death of former Party secretary Hu Yaobang; students begin pro-Hu posters and wreath-making; organise marches to the Square over the coming days; raise grievances about corruption, lack of free speech and education funding.
April 19 – Students march to Zhongnanhai, residential compound for officials, for a second evening; scuffles with police as some try to force their way in, over 100 students injured or arrested.
April 22 – 150,000 attend Hu’s memorial; riots by anti-social elements in provincial Xi’an and Changsha.
April 23 – Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang goes on one-week scheduled visit to North Korea, delaying coordinated government response.
April 26 – Party editorial in People’s Daily acknowledges grievances but condemns movement as “turmoil” led by an unpatriotic minority; students offended.
April 27 – 200,000 students march in defiance—disciplined and non-violent; govt offers channels to air grievances but takes a tough line on looters and arsonists; afterwards movement wanes.
May 13 – Hunger strike begins, designed to coincide with Soviet Union head of state Gorbachev’s visit; gains mass sympathy and participation, rekindles the movement.
May 16 – Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang meets Gorbachev, deflects blame to Deng Xiaoping in public speech, indicating rupture in senior Party leadership.
May 17 – 1.2 million combined marchers and onlookers in Beijing, massively boosted by government workers encouraged by the Zhao faction at Party branch and work unit level.
May 20 – Martial law declared for Beijing; troop entry blocked by civilians; movement becomes mass civil resistance; hunger strike ends.
28 May – Motorcycle brigades and independent workers’ organisation (BWAF) help free 8 arrested students in Daxing county; protesters throw rocks at public security bureau; retaliatory arrests of workers and brigades members two days later; 3,000-strong student protest and sit-in at the Ministry of Public Security; rumors of military crackdown lead to dwindling numbers in the Square.
2 June – Student movement losing momentum due to internal disagreements; provincial students oppose suspension of sit-in; ‘Four Gentlemen’ hunger strike begins, including pop star Hou Dejian, draws renewed attention.

Crackdown and Violent Resistance

A note on the violent resistance: Call them what we will, the nature of many of these insurrectionist urban fighters are outlined under Social Classes, Floating Population, below. These people were not engaged in peaceful protest, nor did they act as organised workers.

2 June Overnight: Accidental Cyclist Deaths & Initial Protester Aggression

A police van on loan to CCTV crashes into four cyclists, killing three and injuring one. Rumors spread that four people were deliberately killed by police, triggering widespread outrage. Tens of thousands protest, confronting 2,000 unarmed PLA (People’s Liberation Army) troops marching toward Tiananmen. Troops retreat, setting the stage for escalating confrontations.

3 June Morning: Clashes Begin

5,000 unarmed troops attempt to reach Tiananmen but are blocked by citizens. Reports emerge of attacks on soldiers, looting of weapons, and the destruction of military vehicles. Protesters seize military buses and weapons. Despite not being equipped to deal with urban rioting,⁵ the government remains hesitant to escalate to full military force.

3 June Afternoon: Standoff & Decision to Use Force

Protesters intensify efforts to seize military equipment and attacks on troops intensify. The military police use teargas to reclaim weapons in one instance. With the deteriorating situation, the government decides to end the movement, authorizing the PLA (and PAP, Peoples’ Armed Police) to act with force if necessary.

3 June Evening: Martial Law Enforcement & Military Deployment

A government broadcast repeatedly advises citizens to remain home, warning that troops would use “any and all means” to enforce martial law. The PLA is ordered to begin the advance at 9:00 pm, reach Tiananmen by 1:00 am, and clear it by 6:00 am. Large numbers of troops move in from all four directions, encountering barricades set up by residents. Initial troops, many unarmed, are ineffective against a resistance armed with rocks and concrete projectiles, iron bars, molotov cocktails, and guns they had seized.⁶

3 June Night – 4 June Early Morning: Large Scale Violence Erupts

Urban fighter resistance is greatest at Muxidi, 5 kilometres (3 miles) west of the Square. Soldiers fire warning shots into the air but are met with bricks and Molotov cocktails. Urban fighters set military vehicles on fire, burning some soldiers alive and beating those who escape. Brief bouts of firing directly at protestors enable troops to slowly progress. It takes several hours for troops to inch forward, finally arriving at around 1:30 am. By 3:30 am, negotiations begin for a peaceful student withdrawal from the Square.

4 June Morning: Tiananmen Square is Cleared

Around 5:00 am, most of the remaining few hundred students agree to withdraw. Soldiers launch a final push, using batons to disperse the last holdouts. By 6:30 am, the square is cleared. On their way back to campus, students taunt tank drivers, at least one of whom drove at them, killing 11.⁷ Were these drivers reacting to reports of their fellow soldiers who were burnt to a crisp and strung up, one from an overpass, and another from the side of a bus, disemboweled?

5 June: ‘Tank Man’

Finally, no article addressing Western Tiananmen myths is complete without mentioning Tank Man, one of the most misused ‘iconic’ photos of all time. This subject is easily dealt with by watching the full footage which shows the lead tank driver repeatedly trying to safely go around the man,⁸ and knowing it occurred a day after the crackdown, when tanks were leaving the Square.

China in 1989

While not a revolutionary movement,⁹ the ‘Tiananmen’ events were both a mass student movement and an urban movement that quickly spread to campuses and cities throughout the country.¹⁰ To truly understand what took place, we need to take a brief look at China of 1989—the economic and political background as well as the different social classes at the time, including the issues that underlaid particular class-based positions and grievances.

Western media and politicians simplified the movement as a noble struggle for ‘democracy’, of the Western-style liberal kind, at best simply as a kind of shorthand, or reflecting the ideology of West ‘good’, Communism ‘bad’. As one American journalist later said,

“…it’s always so much easier to simplify and to say ‘democracy,’ because if you say ‘accountability,’ who’s going to be interested? … it doesn’t have that ring about it.”¹¹

What’s more, most students had an elitist attitude towards the rest of their fellow citizens and were not enthusiastic about sharing the movement with those they considered less enlightened.¹²

Politics and economics

At the time of China’s 1949 Revolution, the age of colonialism had started to draw to a close. Yet, for nations shaking off its grip, independence was only the beginning of their struggle. They inherited economies stripped of industry, political systems in disarray, and the deep scars of poverty left by centuries of exploitation. And the hardships didn’t end there. The post-World War II world saw the powerful nations that had once ruled them find new ways to continue to exploit them.¹³

Intra-party conflicts since China’s 1949 Revolution have revolved around differing approaches to development and governance. While all were united in the project of lifting the Chinese people out of poverty, the political landscape was shaped by recurring struggles between leftists, rightists, and ultra-leftists.¹⁴ Factional battles reflected tensions over economic strategy and ideological differences.

The group around Deng Xiaoping ultimately politically defeated the ‘ultra-leftists’ of the Mao faction in November 1978.¹⁵ This cleared the way for Deng to lead economic reforms, based on the “Four Modernisations”—a major policy goal to develop agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defence. Opening up the economy was understood by all to be part of this process, especially with the US and Japan. The senior Party leadership was united in advancing reform, with factional disputes centered only on the nature, scope and pace of these changes.¹⁶

China’s market reforms occurred in two main stages, prompted by rapprochement with the U.S.—National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger visited secretly in 1971, followed by a public visit by President Nixon in 1972. The first stage began in the late 1970s and focused on de-collectivising agriculture, attracting foreign investment, and allowing private business while maintaining significant state control over industries. This led to a substantial increase in peasant incomes which, in turn, fuelled a mushrooming of small enterprises in rural areas.¹⁷

In the late 1980s and 1990s, the second stage saw privatisation and contracting out of state-owned enterprises, along with major reforms like lifting price controls and reducing protectionist policies. Key industries remained state-controlled.¹⁸ While essential for economic development on global market terms, these latter reforms caused social disruption in the form of inflation, and increasingly-evident nepotism and other corruption by some officials.¹⁹ By 1989, the public backlash against inflation, which ate into recent income growth, and an increased sense of insecurity after the withdrawal of free healthcare and education had already prompted the government to slow the pace of reforms.²⁰

Dissent in the lead up to April 1989

Without going into detail about the Cultural Revolution, and the fact that it was actually Mao who tamed the monster he’d created, the group allied with Deng Xiaoping used the intellectual and popular backlash against it to ultimately defeat Mao and his ‘Gang of Four’, and set the country on the course of further development, as discussed above.

Meanwhile, the post-Cultural Revolution period saw the first major, albeit brief, protest movement in 1976, followed by sporadic activity involving intellectuals and students, which increased in frequency in the lead up to 1989.²¹ Negative impacts of economic reforms had caused the social dislocation of newly unemployed agricultural labourers and workers from inefficient state-owned enterprises. This period of gradually escalating dissent—combining student activism, intellectual criticism, and growing public discontent at the negative consequences of reforms—set the stage for the mass protests following the death of former leader Hu Yaobang in April, 1989.

Meanwhile, the growing discontent found expression within China’s political system, through mechanisms that already existed and within the framework of one-party rule, which was legally and ideologically non-negotiable. Only two weeks before the Tiananmen movement began, China’s National People’s Congress concluded its annual session with an unusual number of dissenting votes. The session highlighted growing discontent over inflation, corruption, and privileges enjoyed by officials and their families. Proposals to ban high-ranking officials’ children from business and restrict luxury car imports for officials were also discussed. Criticism focused on the government’s handling of education, lack of economic control over things like inflation, and official corruption. Delegates were vocal in their concerns, with some calling for leaders to set an example in austerity measures.²² What’s more, official plans were afoot for political reforms.²³

The social classes and their role

To a greater or lesser extent, all social classes in China either played a role in the events or at least influenced key decision-makers. They did so largely based on the material conditions they found themselves in at the time.²⁴

Students

Students had four main grievances: inflation, corruption, insufficient education funding, and the right to freely express and protest these issues. Many were frustrated with rising living costs, declining job prospects, the erosion of state support for education, and low academic wages. They resented the growing economic divide, as peasants²⁵ and politically connected elites prospered while intellectuals and salaried workers struggled.²⁶ Protests were technically legal in China but had to be conducted through stringent channels. Legal student organisations were organised through the Party, that is, only those sanctioned by the state were allowed.

Heavily influenced by dissident intellectuals, and encouraged by Zhao-aligned figures within the government, their movement was also shaped by broader calls for political reform.²⁷ However, they lacked a unified vision beyond opposition to one-party rule. “At Tiananmen Square the people knew only what they were against, not what they were for.”²⁸

Furthermore, the movement was marked by internal divisions and competing leadership factions, each with different strategies and priorities.²⁹ The Beijing Students’ Autonomous Federation (BSAF), bringing together the new Beijing campus groups, was hastily formed in April and bypassed the usual procedures for legal registration. It played a leading role early on but faced internal power struggles, with leaders frequently elected, deposed, and reinstated.

The Hunger Strike Headquarters, formed after the hunger strike began, operated out of the Square with little democratic structure or accountability. Reconstituted as Headquarters for Defending Tiananmen Square in late May, its base was those students who wished to keep the protest movement going and who were happy for radical leaders such as Chai Ling and Li Lu to coordinate this. It became increasingly dominant, sidelining other student organisations.

Meanwhile, the Dialogue Delegation, made up of more moderate academics and graduates, sought negotiations with the government but had little influence over the student body.³⁰

Provincial students, who had travelled from other cities to represent their campuses or simply to be part of the biggest organic protest movement since the 1949 Revolution, also vied for influence, despite being forced by Beijing groups to camp at the edge of the Square.³¹

These rivalries led to chaotic negotiations with government officials, conflicting strategies, and an overall lack of coordination. As the movement flagged, Beijing factions pushed for withdrawal from the Square, while the mostly provincial newcomers insisted on continuing the occupation.³² A crackdown was inevitable.³³

While older participants knew a crackdown was coming sooner or later, most students were ultimately unrealistic about the risks they faced. One author attests to many private conversations in which former participants, who assimilated into China’s expanding middle class in the years that followed, now view their past activism as naïve and prioritise political stability over radical change.³⁴

Intellectuals

The Chinese authorities deemed dissident intellectuals the “black hands” behind the movement, and this was indeed the case.³⁵ They were instrumental in laying the ideological basis for the movement and ensuring it got off the ground.³⁶ The evidence is in the meticulous monitoring of the authorities, since revealed in leaked official documents,³⁷ and supported in the detailed work of vehemently anti-China Robin Munro of Human Rights Watch,³⁸ among other sources. An internet search of leading dissident intellectuals and students who escaped China after the crackdown reveals sordid tales of involvement in anti-China activism in their Western host countries. For many, it probably combined a vehement anti-socialist, pro-West ideology with an easy way to make a comfortable livelihood until the late 1990s when U.S. security state funding shrank.³⁹ Others became successful business people, with Li Lu even touted to be a potential successor to run billionaire Warren Buffett’s investment empire at one stage.

By the late 1980s, much of China’s intellectual class had undergone a profound ideological transformation, shifting from a Marxist framework to an embrace of liberal and neoliberal ideas. The scars of the Cultural Revolution had left many intellectuals and former rebels disillusioned, creating an ideological vacuum that right-wing, pro-market ideas filled. Calls from the mid-to-late-1970s for democracy within socialist principles were increasingly transformed into debates about liberalism and neoliberal economics. By the late 1980s, economics students were learning standard neoclassical microeconomics and macroeconomics.⁴⁰

The prevailing belief in many circles was that China’s economic and social problems could only be solved through privatisation and market reforms. This belief was prevalent within the education system and the official ‘think tanks’ which had been established to research and guide reforms,⁴¹ as well as among dissident intellectuals outside officialdom. However, intellectuals were divided on political strategy—some continued advocating for democratic reforms, while others, looking to the authoritarian models of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, supported “neo-authoritarianism” as a means of ensuring a stable transition to market capitalism.⁴²

After the Cultural Revolution, there was an ideological vacuum as well as a gap in education that needed to be quickly filled to produce desperately needed scientists and technicians. These factors combined to create the foundations of a technocratic elite, focused on expertise rather than political or social consciousness.⁴³ By 1989, many intellectuals were increasingly open in their rejection of socialism, shaping their demands within the language of “reform.” It was difficult for authorities to reject their ideas outright given official policy was driving market reforms.⁴⁴

The Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SESRI/SERI)

SESRI was founded in the mid-1980s by dissident intellectuals Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao as an independent research organisation. Its purpose was to gather information outside official Party channels and to serve as a platform for promoting liberal critiques of Chinese society and governance. Although it was officially focused on social justice and scientific analysis, its founders and members shared a common goal: to end one-party rule and promote liberal democracy. Because of their history of anti-state political activism, Chen and Wang were barred from working in state-funded institutions. As a result, they raised private funding through innovative business ventures, including correspondence colleges and book distribution. These efforts generated substantial revenue to support their research and publishing activities.⁴⁵

At its peak, SESRI operated like an alternative think tank with multiple research departments, publications, and a vast network of affiliated academics and intellectuals. Despite government scrutiny, it became an influential force, increasingly shaping dissident political discourse. Ironically, through surveys, it documented high levels of public satisfaction with the political system. Recognising this posed an obstacle to political reform, SESRI emphasised “cultural renewal and enlightenment” as necessary precursors to democratisation.⁴⁶

From the beginning of the Tiananmen movement, SESRI played a key role. Its members were involved in organising initial protests and providing strategic support to student activists. SESRI intellectual Liu Gang was instrumental in forming the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation.⁴⁷ At first, SESRI leaders decided to guide and support the movement without directly leading it, by facilitating discussions, providing resources, and organising the journalist⁴⁸ protest. As the movement grew beyond anyone’s expectations, they intensified their involvement, fully committing to openly trying to organise the students, despite the risks. The group operated under constant surveillance, and after the June 4 crackdown, many of its leaders were arrested.⁴⁹ While they did not control the movement’s strategy—often struggling to rein in the students⁵⁰—SESRI played a crucial role in its ideological foundation and progression, contributing to its momentum until the final moments.

Workers

In the reform period, workers initially experienced improvements in living standards, broadly viewing them as a trade-off for losing influence in workplace decision-making under the new “one-man rule” factory management system. However, by the late 1980s, inflation was eroding these gains, while official corruption led to resentment at elites who were enriching themselves at the peoples’ expense.⁵¹ State-owned enterprises faced pressure to cut costs, putting job security and social benefits at risk, and new management practices were less democratic.⁵² Workers feared unemployment and the loss of their traditional protections under the former system.

Before 1989, workers had already shown signs of resistance, including strikes—97 strikes were recorded in 1987 alone.⁵³ During the Tiananmen movement, workers participated in demonstrations and most notably formed the Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Foundation (BWAF),⁵⁴ but active numbers remained limited.⁵⁵ Despite some fledgling worker organisations of a similar nature and some worker actions taken after the crackdown in June in provincial cities, workers took no formal industrial action, let alone coordinated large-scale strikes. Absenteeism and informal slowdowns were noted for a few days after the crackdown, signifying passive resistance to initial overblown rumours of what had occurred at Tiananmen.⁵⁶

The Beijing worker-activists of BWAF wanted to support and work with the students, but their offers were rebuffed.⁵⁷ The government, aware of the potential for industrial unrest, attempted to contain workers through outreach visits to factories by top officials. After the crackdown, some workers rallied to help remove barricades or opposed radical actions, indicating divided opinions within the working class.⁵⁸

Despite solidarity actions with students in the final week,⁵⁹ workers never came anywhere near being the driving force of the movement. BWAF, though growing fast, remained relatively small. It established no workplace branches; attempts to organise strikes failed completely.⁶⁰ Unsurprisingly however, the government was not taking any chances. Concerns about industrial disruption led to harsher worker suppression than on students and intellectuals in the immediate aftermath of the crackdown.⁶¹

Despite some authors’ efforts to depict Chinese workers as an influential, or even potent, force in the Tiananmen movement, their involvement must be understood in the context of internal party politics. While it’s true that they marched in their hundreds of thousands on two occasions, there is evidence they were mobilised by Party officials aligned with Party Secretary Zhao, before he was ultimately isolated and defeated, not the independent BWAF.⁶²

Some urban fighters on 3 – 4 June were workers who clearly became carried away with events, exaggerating the size and potential of the movement, and glorifying an imagined historic role for themselves.⁶³

‘Floating population’

Entirely overlooked by Western media, which focuses almost exclusively on students, is the role played by the ‘floating population’, despite their significant contribution to the urban fighting that resulted in the final death toll of approximately 241 people.⁶⁴ Yet without this social class, there would have been a fraction of the deaths, if any, during the crackdown, and no ‘massacre’ myth to be trotted out at each anniversary.

The ‘floating population’ in China at the time consisted of unemployed rural migrants, former peasants displaced by economic reforms, small entrepreneurs (street vendors), and informal workers who lacked urban residency permits (hukou).⁶⁵ Many had moved to cities seeking work but the tightening of government policies, aimed at slowing the negative impact of the recent economic reforms, including reduced credit to rural businesses, left millions jobless. They faced job discrimination, lacked access to housing and social security, and were heavily taxed, all of which fueled resentment. A volatile and marginalised group, some were convicted criminals who harboured a hatred for the authorities.⁶⁶

During the Tiananmen movement, elements of the ‘floating population’ engaged in the protest marches, but their presence was controversial, with many seeing them as “punks” or opportunists rather than genuine activists.⁶⁷ The Flying Tigers Motorcycle Brigade, a group with a mixed-class membership of young workers and small business owners, played a key role in passing messages and coordinating resistance against martial law. However, others, labeled as “hooligans” or “riffraff” by authorities, were clearly involved in dramatically escalating the violence. In cities like Xi’an, criminal elements took advantage of protests to loot and riot, supporting government claims that unrest was driven by lawless elements.⁶⁸

The State

Communist Party of China

During the reform period, senior Party leaders in particular were increasingly concerned about rising crime and moral decline resulting from economic reforms, with corruption—particularly bribery and nepotism—tarnishing the Party’s image.⁶⁹ They wondered if they had not been proactive enough in warning against ‘bourgeois liberalism’ and ‘spiritual pollution’.⁷⁰ Many senior leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, had suffered during the Cultural Revolution and remained deeply wary of mass movements and political turmoil.⁷¹ This fear influenced their response to the growing protests, informing the sentiment of the People’s Daily April 26 editorial, which warned of impending “turmoil.” Premier Li Peng and Party ‘elders’⁷² emphasised these concerns at top-level meetings, arguing that ongoing protests could destabilise the country and disrupt the reform agenda.

The government saw the 19 – 20 April attempts by students to break into Zhongnanhai—the Party’s political center—as a direct challenge and was particularly anxious about independent worker activism. Despite initial efforts to control dissent, the Party underestimated the depth of public discontent and the persistence of demonstrators.

Party divisions

The divide within the Party during the protest movement centered on two factions: a minority of rightists around Zhao Ziyang, who were largely sympathetic to the student movement and calls for broad liberal reforms, and the rest, who viewed these as a dangerous challenge to Party authority and prospects for stable economic growth. It was not unreasonable for Party leaders to view the movement as a potential existential threat.⁷³

Zhao and his allies actively encouraged liberal democratic reform-minded officials and the press to support the students and portray them as “patriotic” and bearers of socialist democracy. Media coverage under Zhao’s influence was therefore favourable, and grassroots Party branches were mobilised to express support.⁷⁴ However, Zhao’s backing of the movement contributed to his downfall, accused of promoting bourgeois liberalism and undermining party unity and discipline.⁷⁵

In contrast, other leaders saw the movement as a serious threat and Zhao’s conciliatory approach as dangerous. While most senior Party and armed forces leaders were initially reticent about the use of force, they increasingly came to consider a firm response was required. The use of force was first suggested on May 8. It was agreed upon on the 17th, over one month after the movement began, and two-and-a-half weeks before they actually implemented it.⁷⁶

The Military

The armed forces occupied a complex position in Chinese society, balancing loyalty to the ruling Communist Party with a reluctance to be used against civilians.⁷⁷ While the military institutionally supported the Party’s authority, its leadership initially sought a peaceful resolution, preferring that the Public Security Bureau handle the protests, who were ultimately too few and not equipped for urban rioting.⁷⁸ The army had not been deployed en masse against the Chinese people since the Cultural Revolution, which contributed both to the delay in the crackdown and the students’ naive belief that force would not be used.⁷⁹

During the early phase of the movement, military units were divided in their loyalties. Soldiers were exposed to competing messages—from Zhao Ziyang’s faction, which popularised the students’ actions, and from political commissars who labeled the protests as anti-socialist. Commanders with children who were university students were torn. A minority of retired and even active officers opposed martial law.⁸⁰

However, as the situation escalated, Party and army leadership worked to ensure military cohesion. Provincial troops were counselled about what was going on and rumours were addressed. When the final crackdown came, the military acted as a disciplined and unified force. Referring to the violent mob, a US military attaché who was in Beijing at the time commented: “The political reeducation at the hands of the CCP commissars had come true. There really were “bad elements” inside the city.”⁸¹

Peasant-farmers

The Chinese peasantry, as the majority class,⁸² formed a key social base for the government which had implemented rural policies that significantly improved their livelihoods. The transition from collectivised communes to the household responsibility system had given peasant families control over their land, boosting food production and incomes while supporting economic growth in other sectors, beginning with the rural economy. In the late 1980s, the mixed impact of the reforms played out and rural income disparities rose. There was also resentment at increasing official corruption.⁸³ Nevertheless, peasant-farmers had benefited significantly from agricultural reforms.⁸⁴

Despite their importance, Western media largely overlooked peasant perspectives on the pro-democracy movement, focusing instead on urban intellectuals and students.⁸⁵ In reality, the majority of peasants opposed the movement, fearing instability and policy reversals that could jeopardise their gains. Studies suggest around 70% of peasants were against the protests. The notion of luan (chaos) was a deep-seated fear for those who had experienced past upheavals.⁸⁶

While there were isolated instances of farmer involvement in resistance, these were exceptions rather than the norm.⁸⁷ Overall, rural Chinese prioritised economic stability over political liberalisation, a perspective largely ignored in Western narratives of the movement, which seem to be far less interested in standards of living in China than in fear-mongering about Communist bogeymen.

Smoking guns?

I have come across twelve different types of claims of Western fingerprints that are not well-supported by available evidence.⁸⁸ Before working through the list, it helps immensely to understand the completely different approaches of the US ruling class towards Russia and China. They wanted to destroy Russia politically and economically. Whereas, they wanted to build a military and economic relationship with China to both counter the Soviet Union and revive the profitability of US companies through neoliberal offshoring.⁸⁹ China had her own reasons for building the relationship, especially while relations with Russia were only just beginning to thaw.⁹⁰

Chai Ling

Claims: Chai Ling wanted bloodshed to force the Chinese people to wake up; left Beijing days before the crack down; was a plant or had insider protection.

Chai Ling was a passionate but impulsive student leader, more of an inspirational firebrand than a strategist. But she wasn’t a Western stooge—there’s little evidence of foreign backing, and she did not receive help from Western embassies in the immediate aftermath. While she spoke about leaving Beijing on 28 May,⁹¹ witnesses had her in Tiananmen Square until the final hours before going into hiding for months.⁹² Her infamous comments in the May 28 interview with Philip J. Cunningham, about expecting (or hoping for) bloodshed,⁹³ reflected her radical stance but not necessarily a calculated plan for violence. Rather, she saw no way out and felt trapped between impending government repression and internal student divisions.⁹⁴ After escaping via Operation Yellow Bird (see below), she later moved to the U.S., but claims she was a planted agent don’t hold up.

CIA

Claim: the CIA orchestrated the urban unrest.

While the CIA was present in China, as is to be expected of an intelligence agency, there’s no record of those convicted having direct CIA ties. The CIA’s Beijing station chief even left two days before the crackdown, misjudging the situation.⁹⁵

China’s leaders were frustrated with Western narratives and influence⁹⁶ but recognised their main opposition came from within—liberal intellectuals, Zhao Ziyang’s faction, and street-level unrest. I haven’t come across any mention of those convicted being accused of direct dealings with the CIA.⁹⁷ While many U.S. Congress-members, after decades of Cold War hysteria, tended to be virulently anti-communist,⁹⁸ the overwhelming priority of the administration and deep state was to maintain stability for economic and geopolitical reasons, especially to counter Russia.⁹⁹

The CIA had correctly predicted Zhao’s sidelining for some time, showing they were observing rather than engineering change. The U.S. lacked a groomed successor for regime change, making direct orchestration unlikely.¹⁰⁰ Even American officials relied on media like CNN for real-time updates, showing a lack of coordinated strategy.¹⁰¹ While speculation exists about foreign-trained agitators in the eventual violence, China’s own records, along with many witnesses, acknowledged the role of local die-hards and disaffected criminals.¹⁰²

James Lilley, US ambassador

Claim: The appointment of former CIA agent, James Lilley, as U.S. ambassador that year suggests an attempted U.S. regime change.

Lilley’s expected appointment was announced on 2 February, 1989.¹⁰³ The official announcement followed on March 15, 1989, before the Tiananmen protests began. His ties to U.S. President George H.W. Bush, dating back to their CIA days in the 1970s,¹⁰⁴ made his selection unsurprising, particularly given the U.S.’s strategic focus on strengthening the relationship with China to counter the Soviet Union, rather than destabilising China. What’s more, Lilley did not arrive in Beijing until May 2—two weeks after the movement had already begun—making it implausible that he had any role in initiating or managing the protests.¹⁰⁵

Though he had past intelligence experience there, Lilley was not deeply connected with China’s intellectual community, unlike his predecessor, Winston Lord.¹⁰⁶ While the embassy did engage with student leaders, this was hardly exceptional behaviour in global terms. The Chinese government warned against such contacts, but Lilley’s own statements suggest he was observing rather than directing events.¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, Lilley was not an anti-China hardliner. After the crackdown, he lobbied U.S. lawmakers to maintain China’s Most Favored Nation trade status.¹⁰⁸ He also resisted pressure from human rights activists to take high-profile action supporting dissidents, preferring a cautious diplomatic approach. The U.S. embassy in Beijing did provide refuge to dissident Fang Lizhi, but this was done reluctantly, with Lilley initially trying to avoid it. He followed orders from Washington to grant asylum, which then complicated U.S.-China relations. The embassy’s attempts to keep Fang’s presence secret were undermined by a public statement from the White House, undoubtedly due to intense domestic pressure on the President.¹⁰⁹

Dark Money

Claim: the student movement received money and supplies from Western security state sources such as CIA/MI6.

Rather than from covert sources, numerous accounts describe the movement as “inundated by donations” from small businesses, Chinese citizens,¹¹⁰ and overseas supporters, including major contributions from Hong Kong and Taiwan.¹¹¹ A concert in Hong Kong raised over 13 million HKD,¹¹² while Hong Kong organisations sent tents, sleeping bags, and telecommunications equipment.¹¹³ Some Taiwanese funds came from private individuals, but old-guard Guomindang (KMT) organisations were also suspected of contributing.¹¹⁴

What’s more, rather than awash with funds, financial mismanagement was a significant issue within the movement. Large sums were unaccounted for, with evidence of student leaders taking funds with them when shifting allegiances.¹¹⁵ The financial situation in Tiananmen Square became unsustainable by late May, with severe deficits in food supply increasingly covered by IOUs from local businesses. Late efforts to manage funds transparently, such as daily financial reports,¹¹⁶ suggest a lack of centralised financial control let alone covert external state sponsorship.

Funds from Taiwan in particular do not establish direct Western security state funding. Instead, they were a feature of Taiwan’s long-standing interference in Chinese political affairs.¹¹⁷ Indeed, given the rapprochement with China, begun under Nixon in 1972, Lilley’s task seemed to be to balance between that and giving Taiwan lip service in order to placate Cold War warriors at home.¹¹⁸ Ultimately, while external financial support existed, there is no strong evidence that the movement was primarily funded by Western security state sources.

Gene Sharp

Claim: Gene Sharp, infamous author of the “colour revolution playbook,”¹¹⁹ was covertly directing the Chinese student movement.¹²⁰

Sharp was critical of communist regimes, including the Chinese government, and his organisation, the Albert Einstein Institution, received funding from U.S.-linked private and state sources. However, this does not establish that he had any operational role in the Tiananmen protests.¹²¹ His own memoir, written in 1990, describes the movement as lacking strategy and unfamiliar with his program, suggesting he was not involved in guiding it.¹²² Furthermore, he expressed disappointment that the protests turned violent on June 3 and believed the students would have been better off pursuing long-term mass non-cooperation. He also questioned the role of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Union, which he suspected of inciting violence and wondered if they were agents provocateurs,¹²³ further indicating he was not aligned with any violent elements.

An interview with Sharp on June 23, 1989, further contradicts claims that the protests were a CIA-orchestrated “colour revolution” or that he was directing them. He describes the movement as largely spontaneous, with little strategic planning, and notes that he and his colleagues were in China only briefly, for nine days,¹²⁴ primarily to study how the students had learned about nonviolent resistance. What’s more, a Jacobin article critical of Sharp discusses his interventions in the framework of nonviolent methods only.¹²⁵ We also know from military attaché Larry Wortzel that some people on the barricades had already armed themselves with molotov cocktails in anticipation of the crackdown.¹²⁶ The available evidence suggests Sharp was not leading the movement but was instead an observer analysing its dynamics.

Warships visit

Claim: The visit of U.S. warships to China on May 17 was a warning against a crackdown.

The visits were a long planned demonstration of close U.S.-China military ties, primarily aimed at countering Russia.¹²⁷ The U.S. Embassy even seems to have sought to align the visit with Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival in Beijing in May, which Russian diplomats strongly opposed, highlighting U.S. belligerence was pointed at Russia rather than China.¹²⁸

After the declaration of martial law in Beijing, new U.S. Ambassador James Lilley advised the warships’ visit be cut short and leave quietly.¹²⁹ Additionally, he suggested cancelling Chinese Premier Wan Li’s U.S. visit if tensions escalated.¹³⁰ He anticipated a crackdown and understood that the U.S. would have to publicly distance itself from China if that occurred. Rather than directing events, the U.S. feared a crackdown and the inevitable negative domestic and international repercussions. U.S. concerns were largely about optics, in the context of long shaped public attitudes of vehement opposition to ‘communist’ countries.¹³¹

Foreign Media

Claim: Foreign media and foreign-funded covert media like Voice of America incited the movement.

Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the Chinese press, such as People’s Daily and Beijing Review, also covered the protest movement quite favourably. Sentiments shifted in favour of the demonstrators, especially after May 6, when Zhao Ziyang and propaganda chief Hu Qili encouraged greater coverage.¹³² By May 9, over a thousand journalists had petitioned for press reform.¹³³ State-run outlets exaggerated the size of demonstrations to bolster Zhao’s position, a phenomenon even noted by the Western press. This media shift was led by editors and Party officials rather than grassroots journalists. By May 18, the press had abandoned objectivity, acting as an advocate for the movement.¹³⁴

While foreign media neither initiated nor orchestrated the movement, it did play a role in shaping the trajectory by amplifying dissent, influencing public perception, and possibly affecting decision-making on both sides. Outlets like Voice of America (VOA) certainly tried to fan the flames and the BBC provided extensive coverage in Mandarin and English.¹³⁵ Both became key sources of information and rumours for demonstrators,¹³⁶ despite coverage remaining largely Beijing-centric, missing the nationwide scope of the protests. VOA increased its broadcasts to 11 hours per day and even transmitted TV signals to Chinese military installations, raising concerns that it was not merely reporting events but actively fueling unrest.

The Chinese government permitted broad foreign media access, particularly during the Sino-Soviet summit, facilitating unprecedented global attention.¹³⁷ Journalists primarily engaged with English-speaking student leaders, which shaped a more Western-oriented narrative of the movement.¹³⁸ Some non-U.S. journalists were even reported to be advising student leaders on how to engage the press and sustain global attention.¹³⁹Western media’s selective framing of the crackdown also influenced public and political reactions. Reports heavily emphasised the crackdown on ‘protesters’ while omitting instances of mob violence against PLA soldiers, including images of those killed by insurrectionists.¹⁴⁰ Television coverage, in particular, played a powerful role, as most Western audiences consumed the events through emotive, dramatic footage rather than detailed political analysis. This focus helped cement the perception of an unprovoked massacre, ignoring realities on the ground, which increased international pressure on China.¹⁴¹

Initially, Chinese audiences only had the distorted Western sources of information. This led to anti-government protests around China in the first few days after the crackdown in Beijing. After which, the authorities ensured widespread coverage of the riotous behaviour of the violent elements, and of the injured and dead soldiers.¹⁴²

NED (National Endowment for Democracy)

Claim: the U.S. was attempting to destabilise China through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

In 1988, only about 1% of NED’s global grants were allocated to China, amounting to US$153,000 (around US$411,000 today¹⁴³). Examination of the distribution of total global funds indicates this is a small fraction compared to the significant funding directed toward other countries and regions. This suggests China was not a primary target for U.S.-led destabilisation efforts in the late 1980s. The focus remained on Cold War adversaries in the Soviet bloc (81% of European spending) and anti-U.S. governments in Latin America (approx 48% of the global total).¹⁴⁴

NED’s early efforts in China were also relatively limited in scope, primarily focused on intellectual discourse rather than large-scale political activism. The funding largely went to China Perspective for the distribution of quarterly journal The Chinese Intellectual, promoting liberal democratic discussions among scholars. The relocation of the head office of China Perspective to Beijing from New York that year, to convene discussion groups, indicates expansion efforts. However, most U.S. funds coming into China were for authorised programs through the Trade Development Program.¹⁴⁵ Notably, even a recent detailed Chinese government fact sheet does not accuse NED of involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen movement, despite discussing later large-scale interventions in Hong Kong, with millions spent there on protest movements and opposition groups.¹⁴⁶

George Soros

Claim: George Soros’ non-profit organisation was behind regime change efforts in China.

Rabidly anti-Communist George Soros established the non-profit China Fund in 1986 with the approval of liberal reformist officials like Bao Tong and Chen Yizi, with the approval of Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang. While it did provide funding for research, travel and cultural exchanges, it did not manage to foster an independent dissident faction capable of taking the reins of government. The fund also backed politically sensitive research, which raised suspicions within the CPC and limited what he could achieve. Soros himself later admitted that China lacked the conditions for ‘civil society,’ ultimately leaving his foundation ineffective. Though Soros poured in $1 million annually to support liberal reform efforts, by 1989 he was disillusioned about the lack of impact. As political tensions escalated and Zhao Ziyang was sidelined, Soros shut down the foundation.¹⁴⁷

Soros’ personal representative in China, Liang Heng, was suspected of U.S. intelligence ties, and several American advisors to the fund had CIA connections, which fuels reasonable suspicions the goal was to bolster economic and strategic allies within China.¹⁴⁸ Some analysts argue that Soros played a “double game,” by employing a strategy of simultaneously advancing his economic interests in China while fostering close ties with the CPC and its intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security.¹⁴⁹ Whatever the case, his foundation primarily operated within state-approved channels and was ultimately discontinued without achieving significant political influence. While Soros was undoubtedly driven by a desire to accelerate China’s economic opening for his own investments, his fund was just one among several other liberal organisations which were locally established and held greater influence.

The Stone Company

Claim: The Stone Company was one of the forces directing the student movement to overthrow the government.

Located in Beijing’s Haidian district—home to major universities and research institutes—Stone was at the heart of China’s emerging tech sector¹⁵⁰ and considered to be the largest private business at the time.¹⁵¹ It had ambitions to become “China’s IBM” and was deeply intertwined with Zhao Ziyang’s liberal reformist, rightist faction.

Founder Wan Runnan, in particular, was a vocal advocate of political and economic reform, but his engagement with the protests appears to have been more reactive than orchestrated. He initially observed the demonstrations before deciding to assist students by providing food and arranging meetings between student leaders and the government. Students were reported to have requested a donation.¹⁵² Wan’s advocacy for political change, including calls for an emergency session of the People’s Congress, aligned with reformist goals but did not equate to directing the movement.¹⁵³

While the company was financially and ideologically invested in the reform process, its involvement in the movement was primarily shaped by its own interests rather than foreign influence. While leaders of the company were sympathetic to student demands and provided logistical support, there is little evidence to suggest coordinated efforts to stage a regime change.¹⁵⁴

Critics within China viewed Stone as a product of economic liberalisation, with some seeing it as a success story and others resenting its wealth and influence.¹⁵⁵ While Wan later fled China and became a staunch proponent of Western-style democracy, his statements—such as supporting economic sanctions to weaken the Chinese government—reflect questionable values rather than a covert role in 1989.¹⁵⁶

Planted weapons

Claim: the authorities deliberately left stockpiles of weapons to tempt protestors into using them as a pretext for a crackdown.

While weapons were found in seized military vehicles on June 2nd and 3rd, this was likely due to troop movements rather than a calculated trap. The military’s immediate response—using tear gas and reclaiming a van—suggests they didn’t plant it for provocation.¹⁵⁷ There are reports of intercepted military transports, making it more plausible that these were opportunistic discoveries and purposeful seizures by protesters rather than deliberate subterfuge by authorities.¹⁵⁸

Operation Yellowbird

Claim: Western security state involvement in extracting dissidents out of China after the crackdown demonstrates they were behind the protest movement.

Operation Yellow Bird was a covert operation based in British-controlled Hong Kong that helped over 400 dissidents leave China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989, including many wanted by the authorities.¹⁵⁹ It ran until 1997 and involved a wide range of actors, including MI6, CIA, Hong Kong politicians, business people and celebrities, and even criminal organisations like the Sun Yee On triad. The operation smuggled dissidents out using bribery, safe houses, and covert routes, often sending them to countries like France, which was more accommodating than the US, where the administration wanted to limit diplomatic tension.¹⁶⁰

Claims that the CIA orchestrated the Tiananmen movement based on their later involvement in Yellow Bird possibly overlook alternative explanations for why intelligence agencies assisted with the escapes. These include maintaining public support within the U.S. as a pro-democracy advocate, cultivating anti-China figures in case relations with Beijing deteriorated, and even potentially preventing captured dissidents from revealing any possible covert connections.¹⁶¹ Ultimately, while the West played a role in extracting dissidents, this does not prove they were behind the protests themselves.¹⁶²

Conclusion

Beyond the crass falsehoods of China hawks, the Tiananmen movement was more complex than that portrayed by people pushing back at the Western narrative. While intellectuals and organisations like SESRI played a significant role in shaping the ideological and strategic direction of the protests, they quickly lost control of tactics. Students lacked unity, a clear vision for political change, and an awareness of the risks involved. Workers, though resentful of corruption and economic challenges, never became a dominant force, and their role has been overstated. The ‘floating population’ contributed to most of the violence that shaped the final crackdown, while peasants—the majority of China’s population—largely opposed the movement, prioritising economic stability over political upheaval. Within the government, deep divisions existed between the small liberal-reformist faction and the rest of the senior leadership, ultimately leading to a decisive response by the latter, which successfully restored order. Understanding these complexities is essential to moving beyond simplistic narratives of East versus West and toward a more nuanced perspective on the historical forces that shaped the events of 1989.

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Bibliography, annotated

As the declining U.S. hegemon wields economic mechanisms and supercharges its military in a desperate attempt to contain the continued rise of China, has understanding China in the West ever been this important? While not exhaustive, this list represents sources that most illuminated the real Tiananmen story for me. For those wanting a more in-depth understanding of the events, the social forces involved, and the challenges faced by the Chinese state at the time, these are my top ten recommendations.

Berlin, M.J., Kalb, M.L., and others, 1992. Turmoil at Tiananmen: A Study of U.S. Press Coverage of the Beijing Spring of 1989. Cambridge, MA: Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Available at: https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/turmoil_at_tiananmen_1992.pdf.

A searchable version in two parts, which unfortunately only begins at page 32, is available at: http://tsquare.tv/themes/TatTcover.html and http://tsquare.tv/themes/TatTcover2.html#anchor392135.

This 211-page paper is based on analysis of coverage of eight main news sources,¹⁶³ consultation with seventy media practitioners, China and media specialists, government officials and other experts, interviews, a workshop and a public forum. It is the most comprehensive study of the demands and aspirations of the movement I’ve come across.

Perhaps most usefully, the wide scope of the study allowed for many concrete examples of media bias. The Introduction is quite sycophantic towards the Western journalists who covered the movement, and is written almost entirely from the perspective of anti-China, pro-‘democracy’ mythology. Yet on page 7, critics of the Western media portrayal get a hearing, and their concerns are often addressed within the body of the paper:

“China scholars and officials of both the Chinese and American governments criticized some aspects of the coverage, and maintained that distortions caused by the media prism had an unnaturally disruptive impact on public opinion and policy-making in both countries. Complaints include the following: that American news organizations… showed emotional bias in painting a too-absolute picture of good students against an evil government; exaggerated the democratic and anti-Communist goals of the protestors; overlooked the fact that street politics are not likely to overthrow a Communist regime unless an opposition group exists and is ready to move into the halls of government; ignored the rural aspects of the uprising [that is, the provincial city events and the rural opposition to the uprising]; did not cover as early as it should have the underlying power struggle between political factions in the Chinese Communist Party (sic); provided insufficient warning of the repression that eventually came; and gave an inaccurate account of the violence during the night of June 3-4.”

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1989. Perspectives on Growing Social Tension in China. [online] Washington, D.C.: CIA.

Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc9.pdf.

This 18-page declassified intelligence assessment analyses the social unrest in China leading up to the Tiananmen Square protests. It was later made public by the National Security Archive. While it likely doesn’t get everything right, and ultimately proven wrong on the overly pessimistic about the Party’s capacity to cope with major challenges, this report gives a useful background to the evolving economic and social situation in China at the time.

Chen, X., 1989. Report on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion: June 30, 1989. Beijing: New Star Publishers.

Available at: https://museumfatigue.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/chen-xitong_report-on-putting-down-anti-government-riot_1989.pdf.

This 50-page report was delivered by Chen Xitong, then State Councillor and Mayor of Beijing, to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which took place from June 29 to July 7, 1989. It presents the Chinese government’s official account of the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests, as well as accounts of the figures involved. Despite some mixing up of certain actions and perpetrators, the report overwhelmingly accords with other reports by journalists and participants.

Cheng, E., Standoff at Tiananmen. [blog]

Available at:

http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/

This extensive website, authored by Eddie Cheng, offers a detailed narrative history of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and provides supplementary materials, images and insights related to his book Standoff at Tiananmen. The material is drawn from many different sources and contains many unique but convincing details and insights.

Cunningham, P.J., 2009. Tiananmen Moon [online]. The China Beat.

Available at: https://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/search/label/Tiananmen%20Moon and other links, see footnotes.

Cunningham’s series of articles on The China Beat blog are excerpts from his memoir Tiananmen Moon: Inside the Chinese Student Uprising of 1989. The posts I accessed gave me a sense of what it was like on the Square in the final week. His eyewitness account of the violent pushback against the troops was also helpful. Most of all, the record of his interactions with Chai Ling are invaluable. Cunningham’s preface indicates he is very anti-China and therefore he has every reason to paint Chai Ling in a better light. Yet he doesn’t, which adds to the credibility of his account of events.

Kelly, M., 1989. Continuing the Revolution is Not a Dinner Party. Available in 2009, Looking Back at Tiananmen Square: The Defeat of Counter-Revolution in China. [online] Freedom Road Socialist Organization.

Available at: https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-7/tianamen.pdf.

This 53-page article is the only source in my selected bibliography that is sympathetic to the CPC, and most similar to my political beliefs. Kelly doesn’t paint the Party as a cartoonish uniform apparatus. It’s the best source I came across to help me understand the intra-party factional struggles, and provide invaluable insights into the different social forces and events. Despite a minor error,¹⁶⁴ it was a remarkable feat to write such an informative and accurate account so soon afterwards, based on extensive prior knowledge of China and through careful study of Western press coverage. NB I understood this article more easily after reading Munro’s Rough Justice in Beijing and the Tiananmen Papers, also listed in this bibliography.

Lilley, J.R., 1998. Interview with James R. Lilley. Interviewed by C.S. Kennedy. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

Available at: https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Lilley,%20James%20R.toc.pdf.

This 159-page interview is part of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. I focused on the sections dealing with his experiences in China. No doubt Lilley held back on sensitive issues and painted his role in a more positive light. Nevertheless, he is frank about U.S. strategic goals and priorities, giving valuable insights into the U.S.-China relationship in the lead up to the events and in the aftermath.

Munro, R., 1991. Rough Justice in Beijing: Punishing the “Black Hands” of Tiananmen Square. UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, 10(1), pp.77–135.

Available at: https://escholarship.org/content/qt7zz8w3wg/qt7zz8w3wg.pdf.

A product of the human rights industry, Munro is very anti-China. His premise is that justice is of an essential and timeless nature, which can and must be performed in the same way, anywhere and at any time, regardless of the circumstances, for example, whether or not the state in question is subject to imperialist aggression. However, this 59-page work gives excellent background information on the ideas and activities of the leading dissident intellectuals, in the lead up to, and during, the movement. He focuses heavily on SESRI, many of whose members were labelled the “black hands” by the Chinese government. In doing so, he very much backs up the authorities’ version of events.

Nathan, A.J. and Link, P., eds., 2001. The Tiananmen Papers. New York: PublicAffairs.

This 580-page book is a compilation of various government documents smuggled out of China, with editors’ notes and footnotes. It illustrates the situation faced by the leadership of the Communist Party of China during the time of the protests, arranged in chronological order from April to late June 1989, and how they came to make the decisions they did.

The authors are anti-CPC, and the explicitly stated purpose of the book was to ‘expose’ the senior leadership and encourage remaining dissidents within the Party to organise against them. However, compared to leaked revelations of Western leaders’ priorities when discussing internal affairs, where the main priority is to deceive the population and deliver for powerful elites, the Party leadership discussions in this book afford us remarkable insights into them both as individual human beings, and the ongoing commitment they had to building governance in China and improving the living standards of the people. Most of them had fought in the 1949 Revolution, when China finally stood up for the last time, and had survived the chaos of the Cultural Revolution—they weren’t giving up lightly.

The authenticity of the papers is discussed in the book’s Introduction, and further in Nathan, A.J., 2001. The Tiananmen Papers: An Editor’s Reflections. The China Quarterly, 167, pp.724–737. Available at: https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/11965424.pdf.

Wortzel, L.M., 2005. The Tiananmen Massacre Reappraised: Public Protest, Urban Warfare, and the People’s Liberation Army. In: P.H.B. Godwin, ed., Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, pp. 89–122.

Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11967.6?seq=1.

Written by a U.S. military attaché attached to the embassy in Beijing at the time, this 30-page chapter offers an analysis of the People’s Liberation Army’s response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, focusing on the military’s decision-making processes under stress. While I’m not convinced of all the author’s characterisations of the attitudes of army leadership and inner-party politics, his background in military intelligence clearly led to a more honest and knowledgeable account of events. His real-time, on-the-ground observations add invaluable insights. Note he questions the authenticity of the Tiananmen Papers, then proceeds to reference it 16 times!

This piece from Nury Vittachi is a classic example, which includes “35 Tiananmen facts you need to know.” Nury does invaluable work exposing more contemporary Western meddling and myth-mongering about China. The strength of this article is in exposing how the Western media machine crafted a false narrative after the event. Yet, some of his assertions and inferences detract from the work overall. I investigated each of the 35 ‘coincidences’ and, while the simple facts are mostly correct, other, equally important facts, are missing. I address 12 common claims in the Smoking Guns section. Vittachi, N. 2023. ‘How psy-ops warriors fooled me about Tiananmen Square: a warning,’ Pearls and Irritations, 6 June, https://johnmenadue.com/how-psy-ops-warriors-fooled-me-about-tiananmen-square-a-warning/.

“…nearly eight years since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia has failed to find its way in the world. The economy has collapsed, with little sign of recovery. Corruption is everywhere. The political system lurches from crisis to crisis without any apparent connection between the political leaders and Russian society.” Note that Sachs brings nuance to the analogy, in that the crisis in the former Soviet Union was worsened by the deliberate Western policy of ‘not helping,’ with the aim of impoverishment-induced balkanisation. (Had the Chinese government collapsed in 1989, there is no guarantee the country would have been afforded help either, especially when the collapse of the Eastern Bloc soon followed, in late 1989, but earlier than expected by America, thus reducing Russia as an imperialist rival for the U.S., and potentially elevating China as one – LP). Sachs, J. 1999. ‘Russia’s Failure to Reform,’ Project Syndicate, 30 August, https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/2tfga7mnpkw2t8dg5f6wjncfg2g6bj; Alcoholism surged. Life expectancy fell substantially, especially for men from 64.9 yrs in 1987 to 59 yrs (less than the pension age) in 1993. Ryan, M. 1995. ‘Alcoholism and rising mortality in the Russian Federation,’ BMJ, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2549015/?page=1#supplementary-material1; Hundreds of thousands of women were trafficked into slavery in Western Europe and the U.S. during the 1990s. This is well-documented by international organisations, governments, and academic researchers, for example “The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 has since provided new resources–geographical and human–for the sex trade and traffic. Indeed, one of the most striking images of the changes in Eastern Europe soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall was that of women lining the highways across the region, offering sex for sale”. Kligman, G. 2005. ‘Trafficking Women after Socialism: From, To, and Through Eastern Europe,’ Social Politics, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228351515_Trafficking_Women_after_Socialism_From_To_and_Through_Eastern_Europe; 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, less than half the populations in Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Slovakia and Hungary believed the economy changed for the better after communism. Wike, R., et al. 2019. ‘Chapter 1: Political and economic changes since the fall of communism, European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism,’ Pew Research Centre, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/political-and-economic-changes-since-the-fall-of-communism/.

“Since China began to open up and reform its economy in 1978, GDP growth has averaged over 9 percent a year, and almost 800 million people have lifted themselves out of poverty. There have also been significant improvements in access to health, education, and other services over the same period. China is now an upper-middle-income country.” World Bank (n.d.). The World Bank in China, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#:~:text=Results-,Since%20China%20began%20to%20open%20up%20and%20reform%20its%20economy,services%20over%20the%20same%20period [Accessed 16 Apr. 2025]; “In the early 1980s India and China had a roughly similar GDP and up until 1990 India had a higher GDP per capita. Fast-forward to 2018 and … India’s economy is 5 times smaller than China’s and GDP per capita is $2010 in India vs. $9771 in China. Accordingly, nowadays most of the major economic development indicators are in China’s favor – for instance, in 2017 the value of China’s exports of high-technology products was 43 times higher than India’s.” Gechev, V. 2020. ‘China & India: A Comparison of Economic Growth Dynamics (1980–2018),’ University of National and World Economy, Bulgaria. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3578163; Considering India is the ‘world’s largest democracy,’ these figures do not engender confidence in the liberal democratic model. What’s more, real wages have fallen in Australia and many other Western countries in recent times.

My article, Tiananmen Timeline, includes extended timeline details and full references.

In late 1986, China identified a lack of appropriately-trained riot control personnel. A decision was made to seek instruction from Japan (considered the best in the world at the time). The process only began in Jan 1989, and thus without a “fully trained riot control police force in April, civil authorities were not adequately prepared to control the demonstrations”. Consequently the government needed to mobilise the PLA to suppress the uprising. U.S. Department of Defense report, 1989. ‘Subject: Chinese Riot Control Police Units,’ National Security Archive, August 8, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB473/docs/13-August%208%201989.pdf.

These incidents were observed by Western journalists and reported in U.S. embassy cables, detailed in Tiananmen Timeline.

Liubukou tragedy: tanks ran over retreating students. The story of victim Fang Zheng, who lost his legs, is recounted in Cheng, E. ‘People of 1989: Fang Zheng,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/04/people-of-1989-fang-zheng.html; This incident is corroborated in official government records, as documented in Nathan, A. J. and Link, P. (eds.) 2001. The Tiananmen Papers. New York: PublicAffairs, p. 383.

https://x.com/kilorocky/status/1003421780839579649 – X post with Tank Man full footage. Unedited footage which showed all the relevant parts was hard to find. This is the best one I discovered.

Some people legitimately argue it was a counter-revolutionary movement, given its aim was to overthrow one-party rule. This principle is part of China’s constitution, itself a product of the overwhelmingly popular 1949 Revolution, which established the People’s Republic of China, a sovereign nation-state.

The best source I’ve found for the vast urban geographic spread of the movement is Nathan & Link (n 7).

Berlin, M. & Kalb, M. et al. 1992. Turmoil at Tiananmen: A Study of U.S. Press Coverage of the Beijing Spring of 1989. Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, pp. 45-46, https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/turmoil_at_tiananmen_1992.pdf.

“The student movement in general was a far cry from a drive for American democracy to replace Communist rule. As reported in the Washington Post, Barbara Ranagan, an American teacher in Wuhan, asked her students in the midst of the movement, “What do you mean when you say democracy? … Do you want to give the 80 percent of the people who are out there in the countryside the right to vote?” She received this reply: “No, they’re not ready.”” Ibid, p. 46; “Mr. Wang says he believes the movement is not ready for worker participation because the principles of democracy must first be absorbed by students and intellectuals before they can be spread to others.” Wudunn, S. 1989. ‘A Portrait of a Young Man as a Beijing Student Leader’, New York Times, 3 June, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/03/world/a-portrait-of-a-young-man-as-a-beijing-student-leader.html; Nor did students distinguish between unemployed people who were new to the city (see Social Classes, ‘Floating Population’) and established urban workers of the kind who founded the Beijing Autonomous Workers’ Federation (BWAF): “’Some [worker activists] wanted to go over and talk things over with the students, but before we could say a couple words, the student picket corps came over and chased us away. At that point we didn’t want to stir up trouble, and were unwilling to set ourselves against the students’. The gongzilian [BWAF] activists saw the same treatment being given to the Construction Workers’ Union, which for a period was located at the eastern reviewing stand…” Walder, A. & Gong, X. 1993. ‘Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Federation,’ The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs. Available at: http://www.tsquare.tv/links/Walder.html.

For insight into the immense challenges faced by Chinese authorities at the time, see Appendix: A Sampler of Social Tensions in Directorate of Intelligence, 1989. ‘Perspectives on Growing Social Tension in China,’ National Security Archive, 21 May, pp. 13-14, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc9.pdf.

Kelly’s characterisation of the political factions of the CPC at the time offers much clarity and can be summarised as follows:

Rightists – Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang-aligned; supported pro-Western political liberalisation and faster pace of economic reforms; described by opponents within the Party as “bourgeois liberals” i.e. proponents of the Western-model of market-based capitalism.

Leftists – supported careful pace of both political and economic reforms; willing to reduce the pace of economic reforms and even make adjustments for the sake of political stability.

Ultra-leftists – hardline ‘Maoist’ anti-reformists who had been marginalised by 1979.

Deng Xiaoping balanced somewhat precariously between the rightists and leftists, holding centre-left positions at times.

SESRI figures (see Intellectuals) are “bourgeois liberals,” i.e. Rightists.

Kelly, M. 1989. ‘Continuing the Revolution is Not a Dinner Party’, in Freedom Road Socialist Organization, 2009. ‘Looking back at Tiananmen Square: the defeat of counterrevolution in China.’ Definitions of faction terms span the first approx. 10 pages of the article, https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-7/tianamen.pdf.

Ibid. Kelly describes factional policies and battles from 1949 to 1989 in some depth in pages up to 20.

For example, in 1988 Premier Li Peng and Party Secretary Zhao Zhiyang clashed over ‘economic mistakes.’ Zhao was pushing for lifting all price controls except for minerals and utilities at a meeting, and a report by leftist Yao Yilin found Zhao’s other economic reform plans were without a sound basis. Ibid., p. 19; Nathan & Link (n 7).

Many policies were introduced from 1978 onwards to encourage a balanced growth of agricultural, light and heavy industries, including Special Economic Zones for foreign investment. Assessments and adjustments were made along the way. The purpose was to increase the availability and affordability of consumer goods, alongside supporting modern infrastructure in transport, communications etc. For this, foreign exchange was essential: Wei, J. 2020. China’s Industrial Policy: Evolution and Experience. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/BRI-Project_RP11_en.pdf; “These reforms provided the pre-conditions for China’s urban and industrial reforms in the mid 1980s.” Wu, H.X. 1997. Reform on China’s Agriculture – Trade Implications. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia, p. 5, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/eaaubp9.pdf, (pages 6-20 are recommended reading for more detail about farming in China during the ‘central planning’ and ‘reform’ eras, that is, pre- and post-collectivisation).

Unlike Mao’s sweeping policy changes, Deng Xiaoping’s approach emphasized gradual experimentation at the local level before nationwide implementation. His Open Door Policy in 1978 encouraged foreign investment through Special Economic Zones, which became the prime movers of national economic growth. The 1979 Joint Venture Law further attracted foreign capital and technology, aiding China’s exports and rapid development. Wikipedia. (n.d.). Reform and opening up. Retrieved April 16, 2025, from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_and_opening_up.

“You had a huge problem with sons and daughters of high-ranking cadres enriching themselves on a two-tier pricing system. They had a state-run price and a market price, and these people would play the margin. Lots of people felt extremely upset with this idea — that our society is supposed to be an egalitarian society…” Pomfret, J. 2005. Interview in ‘The Tank Man,’ PBS Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman/interviews/pomfret.html; Corrupt practices, such as bribery, extortion and black-marketeering, had exploded due to greater opportunities to acquire and spend money, including from formerly honest officials. These practices were causing economic disruption, thus hindering progress on reforms. The widespread resentment towards nepotism amongst officials reduced the moral authority and credibility of the Party. Directorate of Intelligence (n 13) pp. 1-3.

Industrial production was up 17% in 1988 and accelerating. This rapid growth was causing inflation due to excessive demand for raw materials and energy. As a result, Beijing imposed new taxes, spending controls, interest rate hikes, and restrictions on exports of scarce goods. Even these measures were not expected to curb urban inflation, which was at 30%. Directorate of Intelligence, 1989. ‘China: Potential for Crisis,’ National Security Archive, 9 February, p. 3, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc2.pdf; “To stanch a galloping inflation, the government sharply tightened up on bank loans. The pinch has been felt most painfully in the country-town enterprises that have mushroomed this past decade, thriving on cheap peasant labor.” Chan, A. 1990. ‘China’s Long Winter,’ Monthly Review, 41(8), pp. 1–15, Abstract, https://monthlyreviewarchives.org/mr/article/view/MR-041-08-1990-01_1.

These events are described in US embassy cables as follows: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc01.pdf and https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc02.pdf from Nov 1985; https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc03.pdf from Dec 1985; https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc04.pdf from Dec 1986; https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc05.pdf from Jan 1987; Munro, R. 1991. ‘Rough Justice in Beijing: Punishing the “Black Hands” of Tiananmen Square’, UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, 10(1), pp. 77–135, https://escholarship.org/content/qt7zz8w3wg/qt7zz8w3wg.pdf; Cheng, E. ‘Historical Events: April Fifth Movement,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/04/historical-events-april-fifth-movement.html; Cheng, E. ‘6 Jan 1989 onwards: Days,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog],

http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/p/days.html

; Throughout the background sections, Kelly traces a continuous thread of activity of Democracy Wall dissidents (1978-1981) to Tiananmen 1989, as well as anti-African race riots in Dec 1988: Kelly (n 14) pp. 20-21; 1984 – 1985: Mann, J. 1985. ‘Student protests challenge Deng’s policies in China.’ L.A. Times, 5 December, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-12-05-mn-352-story.html. Archived at:https://archive.md/y6n4e; Chen, X. 1989. ‘Report on checking the turmoil and quelling the counter-revolutionary rebellion,’ State Councillor and Mayor of Beijing, 30 June, p. 6, https://museumfatigue.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/chen-xitong_report-on-putting-down-anti-government-riot_1989.pdf; Lilley, J.R. 1998. Interviewed by Kennedy, C.S. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, pp.129–130, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Lilley,%20James%20R.toc.pdf.

Kristof, N.D. 1989. ‘China’s Congress airs some discord’, The New York Times, 5 April, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/05/world/china-s-congress-airs-some-discord.html. Archived at: https://archive.md/RfjeB.

“China’s political structural reform in the 1980s embraced five dimensions, namely democratizing the party-state apparatus and process; arranging for a smooth leadership succession; streamlining and rationalizing the party-state bureaucracy; strengthening the National People’s Congress; and liberalizing intellectual life” within “the structural constraints of “the “four cardinal principles” enunciated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 [of upholding the socialist path, the people’s democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism–Leninism].” Wong, Y.-c. 1998. ‘Restructuring the party-state polity: China’s political structural reform in the 1980s,’ Asian Perspective, 22(3), pp. 95–120, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704184.

The CIA considered the ideological battles to be largely between two camps, that is, between people who believed ‘Communism’, by which they mean a state-capitalist economic model, had had its day and wanted to embrace Western liberal democracy and those who tried to envision how ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ would work in practice. Directorate of Intelligence (n 13). Note: In my research, I’ve found the former view had more adherents amongst intellectuals and many, but not all, students. Workers tended to call for a more transparent and accountable socialism.

While peasants had certainly benefited, according to the CIA the country-urban benefit divide was more of a perception than reality: “What is important politically, however, is not the fact but the perception that reform is not benefiting urban residents.” Ibid., p. 10-11.

Outlined, for example, in this speech by an academic at the time, in Cheng, E. ‘Document of 1989: Chen Mingyuan’s speech at Peking University,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2012/04/document-of-1989-chen-mingyuans-speech.html; “According to our perusal of statements, posters, and speeches made at the time, the students said they wanted change in four main areas: 1) Better treatment for intellectuals, including more money for education, better salaries and job assignments after graduation. 2) An end to official corruption, which had become pervasive under the dual pricing system, and to preferential treatment given relatives of Party officials in getting lucrative jobs and better basic living arrangements (housing, ration coupons, foreign goods, college placement). 3) Political reform, building on some of Hu Yaobang’s ideas, which meant, for the most part, more government accountability and responsiveness to citizens’ ideas and opinions, including broader grass-roots input into government policy. 4) Respect for personal freedoms (which are guaranteed on paper by the Chinese constitution) such as freedom to demonstrate, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11), p. 42.;

18 April, students draft the Seven Point Petition, painted onto a large banner:

Reevaluate and praise Hu Yaobang’s contributions
Negate the previous anti-“spiritual pollution” and anti-“Bourgeois Liberation” movements
Allow unofficial press and freedom of speech
Publish government leaders’ income and holdings
Abolish the “Beijing Ten-Points” [restricting public assembly and demonstrations]
Increase education funding and enhance the compensation for intellectuals
Report this movement faithfully

Cheng, E. ‘Seven-Point Petition,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/04/document-of-1989-seven-point-petition.html.

“Bill Hinton’s assertion in The Guardian that the bulk of the student demonstrators were bourgeois democrats is probably accurate.” Referenced in Kelly (n 14) p. 23; ““The — the liberal faction was sending envoys out to the students in support of them. It was clear that Zhao Ziyang was sympathetic to them. And I think that gave them encouragement.” Kristof, N. 2014. ‘In the U.S. response to Tiananmen, a delicate balance between geopolitics and human rights,’ Council on Foreign Relations, 4 June, https://www.cfr.org/event/us-response-tiananmen-delicate-balance-between-geopolitics-and-human-right; See also: Social Classes, SESRI section, and Smoking Guns, Foreign Media section.

Pruzin, D. 1990. ‘Freeman interview: Wan Runnan,’ Foundation for Economic Education, 1 May, https://fee.org/articles/freeman-interview-wan-runnan/.

“…the intensity of the students’ protest activities was diminishing, prompted by a split between the different student groups over how to proceed with the demonstrations.” Adamec, J. 2020. ‘Telegrams from Beijing: Czechoslovak diplomats on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests,’ Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/telegrams-beijing-czechoslovak-diplomats-1989-tiananmen-square-protests; It’s also important to note that student leaders were mostly graduates, with most in their early 20’s and some in their 30’s.

For insights and details of the different student factions, I recommend the ‘Days’ section in Eddie Cheng’s Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], 15 Apr – 2 Jun,

http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/p/days.html

; An overview of the competing factions is found in a review of two documentaries and a book about the movement: Buruma, I. 1995. ‘The Beginning of the End,’ The New York Review of Books, 21 December, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/12/21/the-beginning-of-the-end/.

Cunningham, P. J. 2009. ‘Tiananmen Moon: Excerpt Part II,’ The China Beat, April 21, https://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2009/04/tiananmen-moon-preface_21.html.

Berlin & Kalb (n 11), pp. 182-183; Pomfret (n 19); Wudunn, S. (n 12); Not to be confused with the retreat of the movement in the provinces themselves. “Yet in the provinces themselves: according to the Czech embassy telegrams: “The embassy stressed that the retreat from demonstrations was even more visible in the provinces. Students gradually returned to schools after a “loss of public support.”” Adamec (n 29).

Despite the delay caused by the timing of Gorbachev’s visit, most observers, including participating older intellectuals, ordinary citizens, and the US ambassador, knew the crackdown was inevitable if students didn’t leave the Square. This would allow normal functioning to return to central Beijing. Provincial students were occupying train tracks in some areas, disrupting essential transport and industry. “…an italicized letter appeared in the main position above the fold of Peoples’ Daily from Deng Yingchao… widow of [former Party Secretary] Zhou Enlai… [making] it clear that June 1 was children’s day, and a grandmother should be able to take her grandchildren to Tiananmen Square without the interference of demonstrations―the students should clear the Square… this was a final public warning to the students and other demonstrators. Her appeals were ignored.” Wortzel, L. M. 2005. ‘The Tiananmen Massacre Reappraised: Public Protest, Urban Warfare, and the Peoples’ Liberation Army,’ in Chinese National Decisionmaking Under Stress, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, p. 73, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11967.6?seq=1; Rumours of imminent military crackdown (from reports of troops approaching Beijing) led to further dwindling numbers of students and citizens at the square. Walder & Gong (n 12); Mothers had come down literally to drag their sons and daughters home in the runup to the crackdown.” Pomfret (n 19); “[Intellectuals’] advice was often disregarded by the students in Tiananmen Square, most notably when they failed to persuade the students to evacuate the Square in advance of the impending crackdown.” Munro (n 20) p. 113.

“I have talked to dozens of people who studied at Beijing’s top universities in the late 1980s, almost all of whom participated in the movement. Today, as middle-class residents of Beijing, they believe that “political stability trumps everything.” They look back on their participation in 1989 as naïve and manipulated.” Zhang, Y. 2019. ‘The Forgotten Socialists of Tiananmen Square,’ Jacobin Magazine, June, https://jacobin.com/2019/06/tiananmen-square-worker-organization-socialist-democracy.

In this case, the intellectual black hands. Not to be confused with lawless elements of the ‘floating population’ who were instrumental to the violence on 3-4 June. I have not come across evidence that leading dissident intellectuals were involved in planning or carrying out violent resistance. At a SESRI meeting early in the movement, ““The consensus at the meeting was that the student movement was an epochal event in the history of China’s struggle for democracy and freedom. It would give the Communist Party the motivation it needed to begin a process of self-reformation, and would be a watershed in the ten-year reform program. Opinions differed, however, on the question of whether SERI should involve itself in the student movement, and if so, how and to what extent.”” Anonymous source quoted in Munro (n 20) pp. 109-110.

SESRI intellectuals helped students run ‘democracy salons’ at Beijing University. “If the pro-democracy intellectuals were the movement’s thinkers and strategists, the students were its active vanguard.” (Bear in mind these were graduate students who had been guided by SESRI intellectuals – LP). “On April 21, the Beijing Students Federation was established at Beijing University. [SESRI intellectual] Liu Gang, the only non-student member of the federation’s leadership, was the main organizer.” Munro (n 20) pp. 92 & 108-109; “Although the movement swelled with some spontaneity and to proportions expected by nobody, it had its roots in plans for a celebration of the 70th anniversary of May 4, 1919, a great moment in the history of Chinese student politics… many of the students who emerged as leaders during the spring had been planning to stage protests on May 4.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) p. 33.

Nathan & Link (n 7) pp. throughout.

Munro (n 20).

In the mid-1990’s, ‘pro-democracy’ groups in the U.S. were getting NED funds, for example, $150,000 per year for Wu’s China Strategic Institute, as well as others. But this evaporated by 1999, when US policy shifted favourably towards China under President Clinton’s “constructive strategic partnership,” representing an about-face for him—since 1989 he had used the ‘human rights’ agenda to attack Bush despite opposition from China hawks like Congresswoman Pelosi. ““There is, in sum, as great a ‘threat’ to U.S. interests from a weak and unstable China as there is from a strong and antagonistic China.”” John B. 2002. ‘Asia Minor: The NED v. Chinese Dissidents’, The New Republic, 25 March, https://newrepublic.com/article/66182/china-national-endowment-for-democracy-dissident?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR0Oz9M0ZLESQ_k3hfX5qAtiAc8RUuf7ZT3w0qavZVBGQfShJWbeuvvBf_I_aem_AThGTGzPjAyYUE_O5IW02oUjmhMa6s4BGyuNJn8tpEBw1C1DNeBxwH8Y4I1Unevj1aJGgyni7sR_r4W0As6TpzEB.

Li, M. 2008. The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World-Economy, pp. x–xi, http://digamo.free.fr/minqili08.pdf.

The four main official ‘think tanks’, the “three institutes and one association”, were a new phenomenon in China.

Li (n 40) p. xi; “In the late 1980s, both sides in the “democracy or authoritarianism” debate acknowledged the legitimacy of the marketization reforms and didn’t consider its effects on workers. Anita Chan’s research shows that “if one sifts carefully through the writings of Chinese intellectuals of all persuasions [in the late 1980s], one is hard pressed to find any mention of working class grievances.”” Zhang (n 34).

Kelly (n 14) p. 43.

See Party section: some leaders believed the Party had dropped the ball on this, neglecting the ideological campaign against “bourgeois liberalism” and “spiritual pollution”, which was considered necessary to counter individualism and crass materialism.

Munro (n 20) pp. 93-101

Ibid., pp. 101-107.

See footnote 36.

On May 4, the 200-person journalist contingent in the mass protest was initiated by Wang Juntao, Zheng Di and Fei Yuan, who were Deputy Editor-in-chief, Deputy Editor and Deputy Director of Economics Weekly, a SESRI publication. Munro (n 20) p. 110.

Ibid., pp. 109-112.

Indeed, on 22 May, SESRI intellectuals, student leaders of BSAF and Zhao-aligned Party rightists came together to form an alliance to align the different groups on strategy. Munro refers to it as the Joint Liaison Group of All Circles in the Capital, or Capital Liaison Group for short; Eddie Cheng uses Capital Joint Conference; and Nathan & Link the United Conference of Patriotic Beijing in Support of the Constitution. On 27 May, the alliance took the decision to conclude the sit-in in the Square on 30 May, in order to avoid a crackdown, and gathered signatures for an emergency session of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples’ Congress (SCNPC). Munro (n 20) p. 111; The Hunger Strike Headquarters leaders initially agreed with this decision, then refused with the support of the provincial holdouts, insisting instead on staying till the scheduled SCNPC session of 20 June. Cheng, E. ‘Book Excerpt: May 27, 1989,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/05/this-day-in-1989-may-27.html; Nathan & Link (n 7); Chai Ling refers to the meeting at 5:25 in this video: search YouTube for Chai Ling interview (1989 Chinese student protests) by Culain ruled by Venus (note at 7:25 she reproaches them for trying to prevent bloodshed for their own “selfish interests” before continuing to argue for a strategy of continuing the sit-in for her own self-preservation). Transcript: https://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_chailing.htm; “Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming knew now that nothing could hold back the storm that hovered over Beijing any longer. They had failed for thirteen years to convince the government of the need for moderation; now, after barely thirteen days, they had failed to curb the excesses of the students.” Black, G. and Munro, 1993. R. Black Hands of Beijing: Lives of Defiance in China’s Democracy Movement, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Excerpt available at: http://www.tsquare.tv/chronology/BlackHMay.html; “We wanted the students to withdraw from Tiananmen Square, but Deng Xiaoping wanted to settle the problem with tanks and machine guns. We advocated the settlement of the issue within a legal framework, that is, an emergency session of the People’s Congress. We did nothing wrong!” Wan Runnan of Stone Company in Pruzin (n 28).

Walder & Gong (n 12); Zhang (n 34).

International Labour Organization, 1990. Case Hearing, point 290, https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_es/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:50002:0::NO::P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID%2CP50002_LANG_CODE:2901849%2Cen.

Kelly (n 14) p. 16.

The BWAF “were not, as the government later asserted, unemployed workers or members of Beijing’s ‘floating population’: as already observed, all who registered had to show proof of employment at a Beijing work unit.” Walder & Gong (n 12); BWAF leaflets show these workers were attempting to critically apply Marxist theory to current issues but, as the weeks passed and the situation became more tense, their propaganda came across as increasingly desperate, for example, resorting to calls for individual sacrifice – LP. https://workersliberty.org/files/tiananmen-clippings-book-v2.pdf, pp. 20-29.

By the time martial law was declared on May 19, BWAF had 150 activist members. By 2 May, some 2,000 members were registered, by 3 June nearly 20,000, in difficult conditions (in a population of 6.6 million Beijing residents – LP). Walder & Gong (n 12); “There were at least two organisations of the ‘picket corps’ variety, both with a continuous presence on Tiananmen Square from mid-May onward. The Beijing Workers’ Picket Corps (Beijing gongren jiucha dui) was a quasi-independent offshoot of the Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Union, and was made up almost entirely of factory and construction workers. The Capital Workers’ Picket Corps (shoudu gongren jiucha dui) was formed at the apparent instigation of teachers at the Workers’ Movement Institute under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and included workers and other urban wage earners.” Ibid.; In the revolutionary tradition of Chinese struggle, “There were several organisations of the “dare-to-die corps” variety, primarily the Beijing Workers’ Dare-to-Die Corps, and the Beijing City People’s Dare-to-Die Corps, both of which mainly comprised ordinary wage earners.” Walder, A. 1991. ‘Workers, Managers and the State,’ in Tiananmen Clippings Book, p. 16, https://workersliberty.org/files/tiananmen-clippings-book-v2.pdf.

In Shanghai, electricity use declined steadily to about 10% less than usual by June 7, caused by worker absenteeism and lateness that reached as high as 34% in 997 enterprises. 12 factories stopped production, and 23 others cut back drastically. 16 ships waited to be loaded at the docks. Note there is no mention of open strikes. More likely it was stay-away activity due to shock, distress and confusion due to the initial one-sided reporting of the events – LP. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 410.

The BWAF tent was relegated to the western reviewing platform at the edge of the Square by the students. “As the movement progressed, gongzilian [BWAF] activists began to feel that the student leaders were insensitive to their demands, and moreover obstructed their efforts to win rights for workers.” Walder & Gong (n 12).

“In 1986 the All-China Federation of Trade Unions undertook one of the most ambitious surveys in China’s history, polling almost 750,000 workers. The results revealed that 80% of the workers were in support of the [socialist] Four Cardinal Principles while about 20% believed them to be outdated, in contradiction to reform, or didn’t know what they were. It is safe to conclude from these figures that Chinese workers do not favor a restoration of capitalism.” Kelly (n 14) pp. 41-42; A list of containment strategies after rioting in Xi’an on 22 April included 1500 workers organised into 15 militias to guarantee security in their work-units. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 68; “…[Shanghai] factories had been asked to donate 10 percent of their workers to make up a kind of militia. [Mayor] Mr. Zhu said they had played a major role in removing barricades of disabled buses set up by students at many city intersections in the days just after the Beijing crackdown.” Bernstein, R. 1989. ‘Turmoil in China; In Shanghai, Protestors Turn Defiant,’ The New York Times, 10 June, https://archive.md/okXWu#selection-405.0-405.376; Worker Xiao Bin, who was jailed for grossly exaggerating the death toll of the crackdown for the foreign press, was turned in by workmates. Cheng, E. ‘People of 1989: Xiao Bin,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2015/08/people-of-1989-xiao-bin.html.

Daxing events – see Timeline, 28 May.

“The organization never established branches in places of work, and therefore it was unable to coordinate walk-outs from factories at crucial points in time.” Walder & Gong (n 12).

Criminal prosecutions came in two waves: People alleged to have been involved in violence were quickly jailed, tried, sentenced and, in some cases, executed to prevent spread of violent rioting. On the other hand, top student leaders and intellectuals were jailed but not tried until early 1991, to ‘publicly decapitate’ the ‘pro-democracy’ movement. Munro (n 20) pp. 78-79; Charges included: “inciting subversion against the people’s government and the overthrowing of the socialist system during the 1989 turmoil and rebellion”, “”organizing and directing” attempts to impede members of the armed forces charged with enforcing martial law in Beijing”, “assembling crowds to disturb public traffic and seriously undermining public order.” Ibid., p. 123.

The CIA believed: that, as Zhao was losing the internal struggle between 26 Apr and 20 May, he or his supporters encouraged, or at least didn’t discourage, reform-minded Party and government officials and organisations to attend protests; and that by doing so he probably raised student expectations. Directorate of Intelligence, 1989. ‘The Road to the Tiananmen Crackdown: An Analytic Chronology of Chinese Leadership Decision Making,’ National Security Archive, September, pp. vi-vii, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc13.pdf; “But by May 17, when it was clear that he might lose the day, Zhao went so far as to try to mobilize the military, workers in state-owned industry, and the government bureaucracy.” Wortzel (n 32) pp. 60; “That Communist Party bulletin boards contained this line [“to get out on the street and demonstrate”], and that it was repeated in a number of places―a military hospital, a logistics depot, and a military housing area―means that at some level the grassroots organizations of the Party were being used by Zhao as a tool to combat the more orthodox and older Party members. Ibid., p. 63; Walder states that after the declaration of martial law [and the defeat of Zhao], “work unit delegations ceased to march,” Walder (n 55) p. 16; Telegrams were sent to army units in the name of the legal government ‘think tank’ organisations. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 333.

“When on June 3 news of massacres at outlying intersections began to reach the square, most members of gongzilian rushed out to resist the troops,” Walder & Gong (n 12); As the troops were making their way to the Square on the night of June 3, “[University teacher] Ma Shaofang went to the headquarters of the Workers Autonomous Federation on the northwest edge of the Square. Before he could persuade the workers to withdraw onto the Monument with the students, he saw groups of emotional workers rushing out toward Xinhuamen which the 38th Army had now reached. The workers shouted to him that too many of their buddies had already died for them to sit back.” Cheng, E. ‘Book Excerpt: The Night of Massacre,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/06/book-e.html.

This is the official death toll: 241 deaths, comprising 218 civilians (including 36 students), 10 soldiers and 13 armed police officers. A figure such as this is supported by other sources, see Tiananmen Timeline.

Wu (n 17) p. 10.

“…small private stalls and an “individual economy” began to flourish.” Wortzel (n 32) p. 66; The self-employed had been protesting over tax policies. Directorate of Intelligence (n 13) p. 1; The CIA described the emergence of a particularly vulnerable and volatile emergent class – unemployed workers from lay-offs or peasants whom the reforms had dislocated to the city – who perceived they had missed out on the benefits of the reforms and were contributing to rapidly rising crime levels. Ibid., p. 1.

As the movement took hold, “it became very obvious there were a lot of other people, people in sort of ragged clothes and unshaven. We began to get a sense that ordinary people, the citizenry, had entered into this equation, and they began to sort of boil around the square in a way, which is quite chaotic, and you could feel something uncontrollable building.” Schell, O. 2005. Interview in ‘The Tank Man,’ PBS Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman/interviews/schell.html; “By mid-May, the students had begun guarding the Great Hall of the People and Zhongnanhai to prevent the outbreak of violence by bands of youths out looking for action who might be branded “hooligans” by officials… Some routinely slept under the highway overpasses or on the sidewalk outside the Beijing Railway Station; these sites tended to be depopulated on the nights of the massive demonstrations in and around the square.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) pp. 54-55; “Mathews of the Washington Post said: “We didn’t make enough of a point that soldiers died too and parts of the crowd were real tough guys. One of the stories we missed was that lots of people out there that night were the Chinese equivalent of street gangs, out there to have fun and make trouble.” Mathews wrote an op-ed page article on June 29 expressing this view.” Ibid., p 149; “Anyone who took part in establishing obstacles to stop traffic and block army vehicles could get 30 yuan a day. Also they set high prices to buy off rioters to burn military vehicles and beat soldiers, promising to offer 3,000 yuan for burning one vehicle and more money for capturing or killing soldiers.” Chen (n 21) p. 39. I did not find any other reference to these payments. It is plausible they were made, and we can only speculate as to whether they came from forces such as the Zhao-aligned faction or Taiwanese agents; “One of the reasons that it was easier to curb the turmoil in Shanghai, was because in late May, city officials began removing tens of thousands of such elements from that city.” Kelly (n 14) p. 55; “The May Fourth spirit was gone, replaced by something murky and malevolent. There was a new element I hadn’t noticed much of before, young punks decidedly less than student-like in appearance. In the place of headbands and signed shirts with university pins they wore cheap, ill-fitting polyester clothes and loose windbreakers. Under our lights, their eyes gleaming with mischief, they brazenly revealed hidden Molotov cocktails… Who were these punks in shorts and sandals, carrying petrol bombs?” Cunningham, P. J. 2009. ‘6/4/89: The Night of No Moon,’ The China Beat, 4 June, https://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2009/06/6489-night-of-no-moon.html.

On 21 April, reports to the government mention unemployed youth trying to incite students to break into government buildings in at least two cities. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 44.

Directorate of Intelligence (n 13) pp. iv, 3.

Especially during the period when Deng Xiaoping considered the danger of ultra-leftism a greater danger than the right. Kelly (n 14) p. 11; Spiritual pollution contravenes the Constitution: “Article 24. The state strengthens the building of socialist spiritual civilization through spreading education in high ideals and morality, general education and education in discipline and the legal system, and through promoting the formulation and observance of rules of conduct and common pledges by different sections of the people in urban and rural areas. The state advocates the civic virtues of love for the motherland, for the people, for labour, for science and for socialism; it educates the people in patriotism, collectivism, internationalism and communism and in dialectical and historical materialism; it combats the decadent ideas of capitalism and feudalism and other decadent ideas.” People’s Daily Online. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, (Adopted on December 4, 1982), https://web.archive.org/web/20100812224210/http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.

Many of the elders had personally suffered during the Cultural Revolution and were therefore very wary of passion or demagoguery-induced turmoil, including Deng Xiaoping who had been a victim of the Red Guards and whose son was paralysed by them. Wong, J. 2005. Interview in ‘The Tank Man,’ PBS Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman/interviews/wong.html#1; Wortzel (n 32) p. 69; President Yang Shangkun, who played an enormously important part in resolving the situation in 1989, had been imprisoned for 12 years during the Cultural Revolution.

Senior members, who had officially retired but were still active on an advisory body, Central Advisory Commission, became centrally involved, through expanded Politburo meetings, to help Deng Xiaoping steer the Party through this crisis. Nathan & Link (n 7).

This is because party and project are intrinsically linked: “And the story also reveals the extraordinary confusion and disarray on the Chinese side. So what comes through is the intensity in the moment. That this was not simply something that was limited to the square, as important as it was, but really potentially threatened the entire political order of — of — of China. Indeed, many in the Communist Party thought that what was at stake was nothing less than its future, and the country’s.” Host of Council on Foreign Relations symposium (n 27); In a May 17 meeting, Party leaders were incredulous that Zhao was still refusing to admit how serious the situation was. Yang Shangkun argued “Our backs are to the wall. If we retreat any further we’re done for… – the stability and unity – of the whole country… This movement could… unleash forces that can’t be controlled.” Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 188; Deng Xiaoping pointed out “Lying down on railroad tracks; beating, smashing and robbing; if these aren’t turmoil then what are they? If things continue like this, we could even end up under house arrest.” Ibid., p. 189.

See footnote 62.

Including Zhao’s contradictory language in his public speeches to the Asian Development Bank on May 4 and Gorbachev on May 16. He also insisted on going to North Korea from 23 to 30 April on a scheduled visit. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 47; And instead of calling a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo before he left, “Zhao went golfing as if nothing had happened.” Chen (n 21) p. 17.

Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 129; Ibid., pp. 191-193.

Wortzel (n 32) p. 56.

See footnote 5.

Two (of only 10 ever) surviving marshalls, the highest rank in the army, did not like the idea of martial law. While they did not come to meetings because they were not supporters of Deng Xiaoping, they each issued a statement: Xu didn’t want martial law to be directed at students, and Nie said there should be no shedding of blood. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 264, in footnotes; Eight generals who claimed they had not been consulted about martial law sent a one line letter to Deng Xiaoping and the Central Military Commission: “We request that troops not enter the city and that martial law not be carried out in Beijing.” They received personal visits from top military leaders, and were pacified. Ibid., p. 265; Wortzel (n 32) p. 76.

Ibid., pp. 69-70.

Ibid., p. 75.

“China is primarily a rural country. Most people are engaged in farming. More than three-fourths of the population is involved in the production, distribution and processing of agricultural goods. Agriculture is not mechanized.” Kelly (n 14).

Peasants blamed corruption for higher prices for things like fertiliser; protested against corrupt local officials; and mobs attacked prosperous farmers. Directorate of Intelligence (n 13) pp. 1, 3, 4.

Wu (n 17) pp. 11, 17; Grassroots input was formative for the de-collectivisation policy. Communist Party Member Network, 2021. ‘A century-old moment: Xiaogang Village implements the “contract responsibility system” for agriculture,’ 2 June, https://www.12371.cn/2021/02/06/VIDE1612578001502681.shtml; Peasants gained exclusive use of land distributed to families under the ‘household responsibility system,’ replacing the collectivised ‘communes’ where groups of families organised their work together. This autonomy empowered farmer families to organise production more effectively and thus produce more food. This, in turn, lifted peasant income which funded economic expansion in other sectors of the economy, most crucially in manufacturing, by supporting more people to work in other industries. Kelly (n 14) p. 41.

Berlin & Kalb (n 11) pp. 104-105.

Kelly (n 14) p. 41; “The ordinary Chinese peasant wasn’t “seized” with their cause. I think that some of the studies done in the countryside after the fact by Zweig, up at Tufts University, said that about 70 percent of the peasants were probably against the students. In urban areas, support for the students was much higher.” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 142; “I remember finally going out to interview a bunch of peasants, and asking them what they would have done if they’d been there in the square, in the army. And they said, “Oh” — you know, “shoot, of course.” And I think we didn’t — I think we didn’t, you know, convey that aspect of China.” Kristof (n 27); Farmers were organised into “rallies against the turmoil” near Beijing. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 329.

Peasants/farmers even marched in the huge rally of May 18. Ibid., p 213; Outside Beijing in at least one place, they lined up tractors and backhoes to block troops on June 3. Wortzel (n 32) p. 74.

These authors tend to use a fact to infer deeper significance, leaving it up to the reader to put two-and-two together, or even link to sources that don’t support the inference.

“In Asia, where the Chinese devote substantial resources and wield major influence, our policies converge or run parallel on most issues.” U.S. Embassy Beijing, 1989. ‘Subject: U.S.-PRC Military Relationship – On the Eve of the President’s Visit,’ National Security Archives, 10 February, p 4, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc3.pdf; Brent Scowcroft, who was National Security Advisor at the time, later said “I think we saw what we had was a relationship with the Chinese of about 20 years that had been steadily getting better, improving. And the relationship between China and Russia was steadily eroding. This was a world which was very useful to us. Was it really democracy versus the Politburo and so on? Not fundamentally. It was geopolitics, basically.”” Council on Foreign Relations symposium (n 27); “And we had been very supportive of the general evolution of the U.S.-China relationship… It was about the threat of the Soviet Union in Asia.” Ibid.; James Baker, Secretary of State at the time, summarised the goals of President George Bush’s February 1989 visit, which is worth reading in full, such was the importance of fostering a stable relationship. “You return to China as President with our bilateral relationship fundamentally sound, reflecting our importance to China, of a militarily strong, technologically advanced nation with whom China shares substantial common interests.” Baker, J. A., 1989. ‘Your China visit February 25 – 27,’ National Security Archives, 16 February, p. 1, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc4.pdf; Thanks to the steadily improving relationship between the US and China over the preceding decade, “the global strategic situation has significantly altered to the benefit of both countries.” United States Department of State, 1989. National Security Archives, 26 June, p. 1, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc34.pdf; “As the US-PRC relations developed, the Soviet Union tended to moderate its own stance to the U.S.” Ibid.

China benefited from U.S. pressure on, and presence in the region of, Vietnam, Japan and North Korea: Ibid., pp 1-2; Cultural exchanges fostered networking and educational exchanges brought much-needed technology and expertise into China.

Cunningham’s account of being found by Chai Ling, agreeing to record her statement, and finding a safe and secure place from which to do it is in Cunningham, P. J. 2009. ‘5/28/09: Chai Ling’s Last Will and Testament,’ 31 May, The China Beat, https://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2009/05/52809-chai-lings-last-will-and.html; This post reveals why Chai Ling trusted Cunningham, having met and spoken to him in the square two days earlier, and how she knew where to find him. Cunningham, P. J. 2009. ‘5/26/89: An Audience with an Audience,’ The China Beat, 27 May, https://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2009/05/audience-with-audience.html.

“…Chai Ling changed her mind about taking the train south…” Cunningham, P. J. 2009. ‘Tiananmen Moon: Beida Summit,’ The China Beat, 27 Apr, https://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2009/04/tiananmen-moon-beida-summit.html; On the night of 3-4 June: “Chai Ling and others were also in the square at the time, but when Hou Dejian went to find Chai Ling and asked her to negotiate with the martial law troops, Chai Ling said: “I am the commander-in-chief of the square and should stay in the square.” Later, it was heard that Chai Ling left with the first group of people to evacuate the square [between 5 am and 6:30 am].” Cheng, E. ‘Documents of 1989: Xinhua News Agency, “Hou Dejian talks about what he saw and heard in the square in the early morning of June 4th,”’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.tiananmenduizhi.com/2015/08/blog-post.html; At 8:50 in this video, Chia Ling and her husband describe the kidnapping attempt on them both, placing them in the Square on the night of May 31: search YouTube for Chai Ling interview (1989 Chinese student protests) by Culain ruled by Venus (note she makes baseless claims in a statement after the crackdown, from 10:15); Black & Munro (n 50) have Chai Ling returning to the Square the following day after the May 28 interview with Cunningham.

Additional video of clips from Cunningham’s interview with Chai Ling (similar to that in footnote 92 but contains additional material):

https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/nbEpfOPPay8?rel=0&autoplay=0&showinfo=0&enablejsapi=0

Cunningham paraphrases Chai Ling’s description of the situation: “the student movement had come to a crucial turning point, the future was full of uncertainty. There were serious conflicts between rival student groups. The Beijing students were tired but tempered from weeks of demos and the hunger strike. It was the provincial students, relatively late arrivals, who were pushing for action. Chai Ling said there was a plot to destroy the movement and she didn’t know who to trust anymore. She spoke of betrayal, of fear, and of her sense of responsibility as a leader.” Clearly afraid and having serious doubts, she tells him she wants to “run away” and has been told the British embassy is offering asylum, although she is wary of who she can trust. Cunningham (n 90), ‘5/26/89: An Audience with an Audience’.

Associated Press, 1992. ‘CIA man misread reaction, sources say’, The Vancouver Sun, 17 September, https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-vancouver-sun/78970117/. (Note: this ‘unnamed source’ also claimed the CIA had assisted students with materials. I haven’t been able to verify this claim, although it may be redacted in de-classified documents – LP).

On June 1, China’s State Security Ministry submitted a report to Party Central on ideological and political infiltration from the West. Once overt military threats and economic blockades had failed, America had employed “peaceful evolution” as a means to try to liberalise China. The “peace diplomacy” under President Carter, “democratic movements” under Reagan and, most recently, “human rights diplomacy” under Bush were all variations of the same thing. Techniques included: ideological and cultural infiltration through economic and cultural exchange programs, funding propaganda through media outlets like Voice of America, efforts to “extend feelers” to top Chinese leadership, targeting “future leaders”, and using technological and economic aid to make China dependent on the U.S. Teachers, businessmen, doctors and technicians from the US were seen as doing secret ‘evangelical’ work. (From what I read in the CIA and Embassy reports, I suspect these efforts had become mostly geared to strengthening the military relationship and opening China up for US investors. The U.S. believed political reforms would undermine socialist policies and enhance pro-free-market versions – LP). Nathan & Link (n 7) pp. 338-346.

Chen (n 21); Nathan & Link (n 7).

“Maybe there were 20 or 30 people in all. My swearing in as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea was a big affair, with a couple of hundred people attending. We handled this swearing in very quietly.” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 130; “Back here in the U.S. [after his post finished] I decided that I had to deal with the poisonous environment in Congress regarding China. I had never realized how ugly the mood was in Congress and in the media about China. It was shocking to me… In 1991 Congress was very “cold” on China. Even when relations were fairly “good,” the attitudes in Congress were still “bad.” It was very disappointing.” Ibid., p. 157; Lilley recommends a senior official deliver a speech summing up US concerns and hopes after (my italics) Congress goes into recess. Lilley, 1989. ‘China and the US – A Protracted Engagement’ National Security Archives, 11 July, p. 8, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc11.pdf; Lilley advises against getting into a tit-for-tat trade war for the sake of anti-communist congressional feelings. Ibid., p. 15; The issue was also used as a political football on both sides of the aisle. “Some members of Congress from the Democratic Party were using this issue to “bash” President Bush with.” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 149; “In large part the atmosphere was becoming very partisan. George Mitchell [former Republican Senator from Maine and majority leader of the Senate] was just giving President George Bush “fits.”” Ibid.; “There was also a partisan aspect to the shift [in sentiment in the U.S. against the CPC]–it was the only foreign policy issue on which George Bush was seen to be vulnerable over the following year or more.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) p. 185.

See footnote 89; Furthermore, in an embassy report on student unrest in late 1986, US Ambassador Winston Lord indicates a strong aversion to protests: “Wang took a relatively upbeat view” of the situation but “the two Liu’s” were more pessimistic. “If… demonstrations grow significantly, become violent, or combine with labor, then many reform policies could be called into question and a major setback occur.” If continued protests in Shanghai spread elsewhere, it could be a “net liability for reform with seriously negative policy consequences” due to an inevitable crackdown. (Note: Unredacted contact names are unusual. I suspect “Wang” and “two Liu’s” could well be dissident intellectuals Wang Juntao, Liu Gang and Liu Binyan). Lord, 1986. ‘Subject: Student Demonstrations Update,’ National Security Archives, 24 December, pp. 1-2, 7, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc04.pdf; “A strong anti-Beijing coalition arose from nowhere. Until June of 1989, there was a generally positive attitude towards China in Congress, but it was more passive than active. Opposition came on special issues… based on the traditional anti-People’s Republic forces on the right. Post June 4 elements in the anti-Beijing coalition included Chinese studying in the United States; Chinese-Americans, who ended their long political silence; protectionists who found imports from China a suddenly vulnerable (and quite sizeable) target; human rights interest groups, which escalated their attacks on a broad range of Chinese violations… and liberal Democrats in Congress, who had until then “carried water” for the Administration’s China policy on Capitol Hill.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) p. 185.

100

“Zhao down but not out.” In Feb 1989, the CIA predicted Zhao would likely be ousted within 12 to 18 months if China’s economic and social problems persisted, which they believed would. They believed Zhao was only hanging on because of Deng’s support, which they correctly assumed would not be forthcoming in a crisis, and that he could be used as a scapegoat for the negative impacts of reform. It’s acknowledged that any pro-reform successor would “be unable to pursue anything other than the most cautious pace on reform.” (This document has substantial redactions but we already know from other documents that the U.S. harboured a strong hope that a transition, if any, would be peaceful, in order to continue strengthening the military and economic relationship, which required avoiding accusations at home of dealing with a regime with purported human rights violations. I believe the U.S. was aware they could not rescue and rehabilitate Zhao through any means at their disposal, let alone by supplying thugs with petrol for molotov cocktails – LP): Directorate of Intelligence (n 20); Ambassador James Lilley (who took over from Winston Lord in May 1989) reiterated: “We had known for six months that Zhao was on his way out of the government, partially because of inflation. They couldn’t stand for that. Inflation was up around 20 percent. That is a real, “red flag” issue in China, at any time.” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 138.

101

“Several Washington officials admitted that for the most part, the source of most of the immediate information used by Secretary Baker and other government officials in the first days after June 4 was CNN. It also was CNN that provided Capitol Hill with its raw information at that time, according to a Hill committee staff member who worked on the China issue.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) p. 170; “Among those who learned of the events from television were American diplomats in Beijing and Secretary of State Baker. The State Department spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler, was credited by the New York Times with persuading Baker to clap sanctions on Beijing, by saying to him: “You’ve got to turn on your TV set; you can’t believe what’s happening unless you see these tanks.”” Ibid., pp. 187-188; “”Discussion of civil war, hyped on CBS news, despite contrary indications from our Embassy, led to eight thousand calls a day at State. [It] panicked the American people. So we had to call and evacuate all of China. Sure we saw the risk in Beijing, but not elsewhere,” said one government official.” Ibid., p. 189.

102

See Social Classes, ‘Floating population’ section.

103

Mann, J. 1989. ‘Bush Reportedly Picks Ex-CIA Officer as Ambassador to China,’ LA Times, 2 February, https://archive.md/IcOke#selection-2453.0-2453.59; 1989. ‘Nomination of James Roderick Lilley To Be United States Ambassador to China,’ The American Presidency Project, 15 March, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/nomination-james-roderick-lilley-be-united-states-ambassador-china?fbclid=IwY2xjawEanYxleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHfOMIgug8Zd0Gj1C9PmTLJ2K3FhqqxBvexDv-CPbfNAziVeZwvid4a_zaA_aem_TcsBNLEd7CoOumG2y3c8mA.

104

In 1975, Lilley was National Intelligence Officer for China, aka CIA station chief. Later, Lilley served on the National Security Council as East Asia expert, as unofficial ambassador to Taiwan, and as ambassador to South Korea. Bush headed the Liaison Office to China in 1974, aka ‘head of mission’, and was appointed Director of Central Intelligence in 1976.

105

“I think that we [Lilley and his wife] left the States on May 1, 1989, and arrived in Beijing on May 2.” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 130; Further supporting my claim that the US was unlikely to be engaged in a regime change operation, Lilley was expected to accompany Chinese Premier Wan Li to the United States on May 12. He made his own call in Shanghai to turn around and fly back to Beijing, due to the unpredictable events unfolding there. “I was told by the Department that as Wan was the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and was a known reformer, was close to Deng Xiaoping, and was a personal friend of President Bush, and played tennis, I should come with him. It was a great opportunity. I was instructed to accompany him on this visit to the U.S. because I was told that I had access to “everybody” in Washington in terms of policy.” (For the administration back home, it was all about the relationship! – LP) Ibid., p. 135.

106

“[Previous ambassador] Win Lord had visited Peking University and met the students and people like Orville Schell, who was then a free lance (sic) writer. Schell came to me and said: “You’ve got to see [dissident] Fang Lizhi right away and make clear your support for human rights… right off the bat.” Well, I had had this same problem in South Korea… I don’t think that was very good advice… We helped get Kim Dae Jung out of house arrest and convinced the South Korean Government to give him an “amnesty.” However, I did not go to see Kim Dae Jung as my first order of business. This would have amounted to “sticking my tongue out” at the South Korean Government.

Q: As a technique, it looks much better in the press than it does in practice.

LILLEY: It “plays” well back in the United States. It doesn’t do much for your relationship with your host country… I was under a lot of pressure from the “human rights” community to see Fang Lizhi right off the bat. They said: “This is the future of China, this is the man who represents democratic principles.” However, I also knew that Deng Xiaoping “hated” Fang and that there was real friction there.” Ibid., pp. 131-132.

107

For example, in this cable to the State Department at the beginning of martial law, 13 days before the crackdown, Lilley expresses concerns that the current govt is weak, that the movement seems to have a permanence about it, and explicitly says the movement may yet “dissipate with compromise and some conciliation. I hope this happens.” Lilley, J. 1989. ‘Subject: PLA ready to strike,’ National Security Archives, 21 May, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc8.pdf; Lilley describes the ways they tried to get a feel for what was going on, including singling out the work of military attaché Larry Wortzel. Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 138; On the night of the crackdown, Lilley had gone out to dinner with a business contact: “I think that I had been out with the head of the SINOCHEM chief, Mr. Zheng. He invited our group out. We had people on watch all over Beijing and we were in constant touch with them. However, you didn’t disrupt your schedule if you’re going to deal with a very important Chinese official. So we went over to Diao Yu Tai on the other side of Beijing with Mr. Zheng.” Ibid., p. 142; Lilley implies he was not in the top leadership loop in the CIA, that Bush was later evasive and did not credit him with predicting the crackdown a few days beforehand. Ibid., pp. 140-141. (I don’t purport to understand what was behind this later tension between them, only that their efforts in China at the time do not seem particularly well-oiled – LP).

108

“I tried to work on it… I went over to Capitol Hill and talked to about 16 or 19 members of Congress, lobbying for an extension of “Most Favored Nation” treatment of China. I think that we persuaded two of these members to go from a negative vote on this issue to “abstaining.”… I don’t think that the Bush administration had done that good a job in explaining what we were trying to do.” Ibid., p. 157.

109

“Well, Fang Lizhi was the only one… I think that one other dissident tried to get into the Embassy, but we talked him out of it. As you know, an Embassy is supposed to take these people in and say to them: “Seeking refuge from us is not the answer to your problem. If you do this, it will complicate our relationship with you and your country.” We are obliged by Foreign Service Regulations to make that explanation to an asylum seeker. However, in the case of Fang, we initially convinced him to leave the Embassy. He went to the Jianguo Hotel, with, I believe, the Time magazine correspondent and a U.S. college professor. We reported this and then were given instructions from Washington to go out and bring Fang and his wife back into the Embassy.” Ibid., p. 146. Lilley tried to keep Fang’s presence in the embassy secret but President Bush’s press secretary spoke about it publicly which caused all manner of trouble for the embassy back in China! Ibid., p. 148.

110

“The students had taken in enormous sums of money in donations from ordinary citizens and from abroad,” Walder & Gong (n 12); Students did fundraising of their own around the city: Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 73.

111

Berlin & Kalb (n 11) p. 175.

112

Lilley, J., 1989. ‘SITREP No. 29 (Situation Report)’, Item 16, Wikileaks, 3 June, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/89BEIJING15407_a.html.

113

“After June 4, the Chinese government made a big issue out of Hong Kong involvement with the protesters. On June 9 People’s Daily did a front-page story on Hong Kong influence on the movement. It used three Hong Kong newspapers (Ta Kung Pao, Ming Pao and Ching Pao) to document Hong Kong “interference.” Among the groups cited: “the 81-man Beijing Students Comfort Group” and the “Materials Liaison Center,” created by the Hong Kong Federation of Students, the Contemporary China Society, the Students’ Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and other organizations. These groups were said to have assisted the movement with “blankets, sleeping bags, telecommunications equipment” and other materials, as well as millions of Hong Kong dollars.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) pp. 172-173.

114

Ibid., p. 175.

115

“Zhou Yongjun, a student at Beijing University of Politics and Law, who early on had headed the Federation of Beijing Students’ Unions before the rise of such leaders as Wuer Kaixi and Chai Ling, came over to gongzilian [BWAF] during the last week of May, bringing with him a large sum of money that had been donated to the student movement under his control.” Walder & Gong (n 12) footnote 53; “Feng Congde… had learned that the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation had taken a sizable donation fund with them when they were forced out.” Cheng, E. ‘This Day in 1989: May 26, Students Vote to Continue Occupying Tiananmen Square,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/05/this-day-in-1989-may-26.html; At the Capital Joint Conference meeting of May 27, “Under pressure, a student in charge of finance for the [BAS] Federation promised to release some of its funds right away. But he also claimed that their fund was not large either. With the burn rate Feng Congde cited, it would not come close to sustaining them till June 20.” Cheng, E. ‘Book Excerpt: May 27, 1989,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/05/this-day-in-1989-may-27.html.

116

Cheng, E. ‘This Day in 1989: May 25, Yang Tao Proposes “Empty Campus” Plan,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/05/this-day-in-1989-may-25.html.

117

A State Security Ministry report lists Taiwanese agents who have been detained for coming to China to watch events closely and send information back to Taiwan. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 348; Ambassador Lilley avoids opening a can of worms and implies Taiwan has long been meddling. “Then a “leading American,” and, of course I won’t say who it was, said: “You know, Taiwan has ‘bought into’ this Fang Lizhi and his wife,” sort of hinting that Taiwan was at fault. This is typical of what Americans do. I said: “Look, if you want to get into whom Taiwan has ‘bought off’ in the Chinese Government, you’ll find that they have ‘bought off’ many of the senior officials, including provincial leaders and all kinds of other people.”” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) pp. 147-8.

118

Lilley’s immediate position prior to the China assignment was Taiwan envoy, suggesting his role was to balance US interests between the two countries to minimise upsetting either government; While the U.S. wanted to continue to increase military sales to China for “political and economic reasons”, Ambassador Lord advised in February it must be sensitive to not upset the delicate power relationships vis-a-vis ASEAN, Japan and Taiwan. U.S. Embassy Beijing (n 89) p. 2.

119

In fact he wrote many works, including a number preceding 1989. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gene_Sharp#Works.

120

One of the more egregious examples is this article, where provided sources about Gene Sharp contradict the claims. Sun Feiyang & Day, R. 2021. ‘Another view of Tiananmen,’ RedSails.org, https://redsails.org/another-view-of-tiananmen.

121

Sharp was a tool of U.S. intelligence, applying his methods selectively to non-U.S.-friendly governments. “To sum up: throughout the Cold War, Gene Sharp theorized defense questions, with US Department of Defense monies, with express reference to the Soviet Union, with the approbation of US defense leadership, within an intellectual nerve center of the US defense and intelligence establishment, the CIA at Harvard. He even directly counseled those applying his theories on the ground in the Soviet Union. He was a Cold War defense intellectual.” Smith, M. 2019. ‘Getting Gene Sharp Wrong,’ Jacobin, https://jacobin.com/2019/12/gene-sharp-george-lakey-neoliberal-nonviolence.

122

Sharp portrays the protests as a largely spontaneous, homegrown movement with limited strategic planning and formal knowledge of nonviolent resistance, concluding a need for Chinese students and scholars to study historical nonviolent movements and organise themselves better in the future: Sharp, G. in Spencer, M. 1989. ‘Killing the Pig to Frighten the Monkey,’ Peace Magazine, August–September, https://peacemagazine.org/archive/v05n4p16.htm; Sharp was clearly against what he considered ‘communist’ regimes, and described the Chinese government as a “distasteful regime.” In this article he reports on his experience in Beijing. He found the students had learned of numerous historical nonviolent movements in school, but he considered them to have little knowledge of the body of work on theories of nonviolence. Furthermore, they had little actual strategy, making decisions only on short term tactical considerations, and were not particularly familiar with his program. Sharp, G. & Jenkins, B. 1990. ‘Nonviolent Struggle in China: an Eyewitness Account,’ Social Alternatives, pp. 43-45, https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90sa/90sa_Sharp.pdf. (Note this was written in 1990 yet the authors repeat the myth that thousands may have died. On p. 47 they states there appeared to be attempts to provoke the students to violence. However, he does not mention the violence towards the troops, despite the Chinese authorities making this known – I find this disingenuous. – LP).

123

Sharp expresses disappointment that the protest turned violent on June 3. He believes it would have been better had the students called off the sit-in and proceeded to agitate amongst the people of the need for larger scale mass non-violent, non-cooperation in future; He makes assumptions about the BWAF without mentioning the criminal and/or unemployed element in the urban fighting. Ibid., pp. 45-46. In answer to his questions: “Who were the members of the Autonomous Workers Union?” – see Social Classes, Workers section. “Why were they so physically separated from the student occupation?” – see footnotes 12 & 57. Sharp also states the workers left their tent around 11pm, implying subterfuge. In reality, many of their number had gone to West Chang’An to join the fighting, and the remainder were invited to join the students at the Monument in the Square. (Given the purpose of the visit was to study the movement, Sharp’s ignorance of even the basic details about BWAF suggests an elitist disinterest in workers. – LP).

124

Sharp arrived on May 28, six days before the crackdown, and was therefore hardly in a position to direct a seven week-long movement. Ibid., p. 43.

125

Albeit his own carefully crafted classless version of nonviolence, ignoring indirect or structural violence: Smith (n 120).

126

“Having been moving around the city all day taking stock of events, this attaché was dirty, hot, thirsty, and tired when approaching a roadblock designed to stop the PLA manned by workers on the second ring road in Beijing, near the Bell Tower. Two young men wore PLA ammunition bandoleers over their shoulders filled with one-liter Beijing beer bottles. When offered money for a bottle of beer, a young man replied, “These are filled with gasoline; when the PLA comes after the students, they’ll see what ‘People’s War’ really means. We’ll give it to them.” Two weeks later that is exactly what happened.” Wortzel (n 32).

127

“Gorbachev was coming to China to restore Communist Party relationships with Communist Party of China leader Deng Xiaoping. Both Gorbachev and Deng were ballyhooing this visit as a “big deal.” They were sort of saying: “In your face, America.” The old Kissingerites in Washington, the old “triangular pole” people, were saying: “This is bad news. The Soviet Union and communist China are getting back together.” So, therefore, our U.S. Navy ship visit to Shanghai “upstaged” that visit by Gorbachev to China, to a certain extent. The visit suggested that Chinese military relationships with the U.S. were very strong. Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping were meeting in Beijing, and we had U.S. Navy ships coming into Shanghai. Our admiral, in full dress uniform with all of his ribbons and everything, was going to go up to Beijing to be received at the “Great Hall of the People.” He was going to get VIP [Very Important Person] treatment.” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 134.

128

U.S. Embassy Beijing, 1989. ‘Subject: Soviet DCM asks about U.S. ship visit to Shanghai; Comments on summit and Cambodia,’ National Security Archives, 24 April, pp. 2-4, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB47/doc7.pdf.

129

After Shanghai, the US cancelled the US Marshall visit to Beijing: “Can you imagine what might have happened if the American admirals had been up in Beijing and got involved around the time of the “crackdown” by the Chinese Government against the demonstrators?” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 136; Lilley, National Security Archives (n 106) p. 2.

130

U.S. Embassy Beijing (n 128) p. 2; Lilley also suggests they “take a hard look at” a scheduled upcoming visit by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Vuono. Ibid., p. 3.

131

See footnotes 89 re Russia, & 98 re China.

132

Kelly (n 14) pp. 29-30; On p. 29, Kelly argues the press aligned with the right for three key reasons: First, the right-wing faction actively pushed out consistent Marxist-Leninists from press roles, limiting their influence. Second, many journalists brought in after the fall of the Gang of Four had questionable political backgrounds, as the press had previously supported the Gang during the Cultural Revolution. Additionally, many journalism graduates, like other students in China, lacked a strong Marxist orientation, making them more susceptible to right-leaning views.

133

Cheng, E. ‘Documents of 1989: A petition from journalists in the capital asking for dialogue,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.tiananmenduizhi.com/2015/05/blog-post_8.html.

134

Kelly (n 14) pp. 29-30; Cheng, E. ‘This Day in 1989: May 18, Premier Li Peng Meets with Students,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/05/this-day-in-1989-may-18.html.

135

Along with hostile forces in Taiwan and Hong Kong, “Western news agencies showed unusual zeal. The Voice of America, in particular, aired news in three programmes beamed to the Chinese mainland for a total of more than ten hours everyday, spreading rumours, stirring up trouble and adding fuel to the turmoil.” Chen (n 21) p. 16; “The Chinese government constantly referred to the ubiquitous Voice of America as the “Voice of Rumor” and claimed it was actively trying to overthrow the government [it was – LP], and some American newspapers in our sample did note the popularity of the news coverage by the Voice of America quite early on. On May 9, WuDunn wrote in the New York Times of the Voice of America’s emerging role as the main source of alternative news in China. She described “students huddling around posters that report the latest Voice bulletins” and “hundreds of students crowded around a dormitory window listening to a dispatch.” She identified the Chinese audience as “some 60 million listeners” and said it seemed “to have a greater effect on local politics than do China’s own news organizations.”” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) pp. 114-115.

136

Openly and proudly trying to incite civil war! “The broadcast of news to the military is significant because of reports that units backing the pro-democracy demonstrators may have exchanged fire with units supporting the crackdown [they hadn’t – LP]. “We are sending a television signal that is available to every major military installation in China,” Mr. Carlson said.” AP, 1989. ‘Voice of America Beams TV Signals to China,’ New York Times, 9 June, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/09/world/voice-of-america-beams-tv-signals-to-china.html. Archived at: https://archive.is/lqIaq.

137

“At no time after the demonstrations began was there a serious attempt to keep journalists out of China.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) p. 92.

138

Ibid., pp. 41-42.

139

“Shen Tong, the Beijing University student leader, recalled the United States press’s being less involved and more professional than that of Europe or Hong Kong. “No American journalist was constantly in my room,” he recalled, “but there were Hong Kong, British–such as BBC reporters–and French reporters. They were there as consultants,” he went on, “to tell me how to deal with the questions during the press conference and how to take the opportunities to make some news…. As one of the BBC reporters said, ‘You have to keep the story rolling.’ That was quite an amazing phrase for me.”” Ibid., pp. 72-73.

140

“His most memorable photo for me was of a PLA soldier hanging from a bus at the Xidan intersection on Changan Avenue to the west of Tiananmen Square. The soldier’s body was burnt to a crisp. It was disgusting, and it was decided not to send it to subscribers.” Earnshaw, G. 2001. ‘Tiananmen Story,’ Graham Earnshaw, https://earnshaw.com/writings/memoirs/tiananmen-story (Earnshaw was a Reuters journalist at the time).

141

This study concluded that television coverage was more problematic than print. TV news left out important stories when there was no suitable footage as accompaniment. TV images were more emotive, revealing Chinese people as tangible human beings who could be empathised with for the first time. Harder facts on the ground, including the political context, were often not given, lending a more up-up-and-away impression of the movement. “And, as the Gallup poll of July 1989 established, 80 percent of those who followed the China story learned of the events initially from television, compared to 11 percent from newspapers and 5 percent from radio.” Berlin & Kalb (n 11) pp. 186-188.

142

This is a Chinese government cut of the barricade battles, including footage of the damage and clean up over the next couple of days. The aftermath section contains date stamps but I can’t verify the sequence of events during the crackdown. Nevertheless, it’s clear that widespread violence was perpetrated by urban fighters. Thanks to Nik Stankovic for adding the English translation. Nik refers to this night not as a protest but an insurrection, which I agree is a more accurate term, https://x.com/nikstankovic_/status/1798217258885410963?s=46&t=FG8tfSP4V48uh2tPlvo4Jw.

143

Inflation calculator, www.officialdata.org.

144

National Endowment for Democracy. Annual Report 1988 (1 Oct 1987 – 30 Sep 1988), https://www.ned.org/docs/annual/1988%20NED%20Annual%20Report.pdf?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR0lE6omtx75LsNDGf9vsONow5U6mWAUxdpFpVnaCOEnIFIEdT-5Z-ZwVZk_aem_AThptB3mKJkCGNGncLWqvg1hoaCyoJNExcbhqdTClhE7BbEk2bQA3Ze6fXiZ60eJDvI1KU7-BJAk_DtVcrReo8lX. Distribution was as follows:

Africa: $1,571,000 (33% – South Africa)

Asia: $1,988,000 ($153,000 of total $1,462,000 (excluding regional) = 10.5% – China)

Europe: $3,695,000 ($2,763,000 out of $3,393,000, excluding regional, = at least 81% – Eastern Europe and Soviet Union)

Latin America: $6,677,000 (Chile the biggest recipient now that the US administration had turned against Pinochet under Reagan, followed by Nicaragua)

Multiregional programs: $846,000

Total global allocation: $14,777,000 or $13,931,000 without multiregional($153,000 out of total = approx 1% – China); In 1989 (Oct – Sep), the total spent on China approximately doubled to $300,000 including Tibet and Taiwan which were absent in 1988. National Endowment for Democracy. 1989 Annual Report, https://www.ned.org/docs/annual/1989%20NED%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

145

“At that time, China was getting a lot of what we called “TDP” funds, or Trade Development Program funds. China got about 60 percent of the amount allocated to the world. We were pouring money into China for “feasibility studies.” This gave us a crack at getting a (sic) big contracts. That was a big item at that time.” Lilley in Kennedy (n 21) p. 132.

146

“The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its affiliate, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), have been involved in Hong Kong’s political landscape since 1997, allegedly interfering in China’s internal affairs. NDI has published multiple reports influencing Hong Kong’s democratic development, funded protests such as the 2003 “1 July marches,” and provided training and financial support to opposition groups. It has organized summits, political training programs, and projects targeting youth and emerging activists. In 2020, NED spent $2 million on Hong Kong-related projects, focusing on disrupting Legislative Council (LegCo) elections, mobilizing student activists, and strengthening regional networks for the pro-democracy movement.” Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Lagos, 2022. Fact Sheet on the National Endowment for Democracy, http://lagos.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202205/t20220507_10683098.htm?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR1siRCtQB3aKypk_GRJLwyD288Nv3mDR5Gc7XNkN18xqoplYIOa7R5MyjY_aem_ATi0D_A_BsSpswxDqThCNiK5-_I2WWfG2o5bukXObmtUe6pioDrLWxbN8ZLusTMC-a1yUhJ0ercSy2cKezyGLR1L.

147

“Soros’ own conclusion on the affair was: “It became clear to me that I had made a mistake in setting up a foundation in China. China was not ready for it because there was no independent or dissident intelligentsia …. The foundation could not become an institution of civil society because civil society did not really exist.” G. Soros, Opening the Soviet System, 15 (1990).” Quoted in Munro (n 20) p. 106, footnotes.

148

Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 342; Liang visited China in August, 1988, and reported to the source that conditions had changed in China and the pro-liberalisation figures were struggling to have influence. Ibid.

149

While appearing to support ‘democracy’, Soros was not averse to collaborating with a regime he publicly considered authoritarian – LP. Anand, A. 2023. ‘George Soros and Chinese spy agency worked together as comrades,’ First Post, 22 February, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/global-watch-george-soros-and-chinese-spy-agency-worked-together-as-comrades-12190572.html.

150

The area “had been transformed from a sleepy, dusty backwater to a bustling accumulation of new technology enterprises, housed behind expanses of plate glass and metal shopfronts,” along with scores of tertiary institutions, scientific research institutes and the headquarters of the Academy of Sciences. Kelly, D. 1989. ‘Massacre of a Chinese Company’, Australian Financial Review, 4 October, https://www.afr.com/politics/massacre-of-a-chinese-company-19891004-j8kr4.

151

Pruzin (n 28); Without Wan and Cao at the helm, Stone later underwent an MBO, management buy-out, in 1998 due to management division and problems, similar to those occurring in some state-owned enterprises, in readiness for accession to the WTO in 2001. Li, S. & Xu, N. 2015. ‘The Influences of WTO Accession on China’s State-Owned Enterprises’, Open Journal of Business and Management, 3(2), pp. 192–198, https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=55786.

152

At a May 6 meeting, the Beijing Autonomous Students Foundation decided to approach the Stone Company for assistance with printing costs (unsurprising given it was a tech company – LP): Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 125.

153

Stone executive and bankruptcy expert Cao Siyuan also intervened: “At the latter stage of the movement, he was the driving force behind scenes to get the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress involved in resolving the conflict. He lobbied [SCNPC] member Hu Jiwei and eventually collected 46 signatures from the Standing Committee members in Beijing on a petition for an emergency meeting of the committee. Although it more than met the legal requirement, the meeting did not take place. Because of his effort, Cao Siyuan was among the few intellectuals arrest (sic) in early June, even before the massacre. He stayed in jail for about a year.” Cheng, E. ‘People of 1989: Cao Siyuan (曹思源),’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2014/11/people-of-1989-cao-siyuan.html; Not counting duplicates, 57 people signed one or more of the proposals, although after investigation, six members subsequently denied signing. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 292.

154

“Stone was already starting to boast its own “corporate culture”, and diverting some of its profits into think-tanks such as the Stone Social Development Research Institute. In those days [May 1988], it was an open question as to whether these would oppose democratisation or back it. The former seemed most probable, like certain Eastern European neo-conservative groups which similarly came from the new entrepreneurial sector and did not want the boat rocked too hard by the likes of Solidarity [in Poland]. Things turned out otherwise. In the ensuing 12 months the Stone institute, drawn more and more into the fight to save the Zhao programmes, emerged as a defender of a strong version of political reform and eventually part of the popular demonstration movement.” Kelly (n 150).

155

The Stone Group was a huge success story, yet it was not immune from the rorting known to be occurring in the newly developing private sector, especially amongst relatives of top officials. “Much gossip was traded about Wan Runnan’s lifestyle, his palatial home and so on.” There was also resentment at private poaching of talent from the State R&D sector. Ibid.

156

“Of course I’m for continued economic sanctions because any difficulty that can be created for the current regime is a favor to China’s democratic movement… It’s true that the usefulness of economic sanctions is limited, and I agree that in the long term they will fail. But before they fail sanctions do some damage. [Premier] Li Peng himself has felt the proof.” Pruzin (n 28).

157

“At the Xidan intersection just west of Tiananmen… Students boarded a bus that was carrying military gear and supplies, found guns, and displayed the guns on top of the bus.” Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 367; “Near Xinhuamen, students seized another nondescript van and found weapons including machine guns and automatic assault rifles inside. They displayed the guns on the roof for news cameras. At high noon, just as a huge crowd assembled there, barrages of tear gas canisters rained down the scene. Soldiers burst out of Xinhuamen to disperse the crowd and recover the vehicle.” Cheng, E. ‘This Day in 1989, June 3, The Even (sic) of Massacre,’ Standoff at Tiananmen [blog], http://www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/06/this-day-in-1989-june-3.html; Police fired teargas but were counterattacked by the crowd, forcing a retreat through the West Gate into the compound. Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 367; “Police use teargas on crowds at the walled compound at Zhongnanhai, near Tiananmen Square, according to press reports.” Department of State 1989. ‘Secretary’s morning summary for June 3, 1989,’ p. 10, National Security Archives, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/docs/doc09.pdf; Lilley (n 111), Item 4.

158

Authorities were condemning the practice in the evening broadcast: “Some people even stole weapons the announcement said.” Ibid., Item 9.’; “Troops approaching Tiananmen from the south were stopped when citizens surrounded 21 army trucks and asked the soldiers questions about their units, their objectives and their weapons; the soldiers did not reply… They were beaten when they went to get their ammunition, and some of the wounded soldiers were kidnapped when they headed for the hospital. Beijing security personnel were beaten when they went to aid the soldiers.” Nathan & Link (n 7) p. 367; “Military vehicles were overturned and soldiers were searched for weapons.” Toronto Globe and Mail, quoted in Kelly (n 14) p. 37; “On the morning of June 3rd more attacks were made on military vehicles. Reporters for Time magazine stated, “By 7 a.m. though, students and young workers outside Zhongnanhai were smashing their way into two military buses filled with light machine guns and crates of ammunition…”” Ibid.

159

Wikipedia contains an account with sources, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Yellowbird.

160

This article describes daring scenes which would not be out of place in an action movie: Hewitt, G. 1991. ‘The Great Escape from China’, Washington Post, 2 June, https://web.archive.org/web/20180615214807/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/06/02/the-great-escape-from-china/5da31d0d-aca1-4c56-9178-767d14c29f62/?utm_term=.345fc3f55ac2.

161

Evidence for the latter is yet to be revealed, to my knowledge – LP.

162

The operation’s reliance on organised crime raises ethical concerns – LP. Triads like Sun Yee On, known for trafficking, smuggling, and narcotics, were key facilitators, and received advanced equipment. “The escape network had access to a variety of boats and equipment normally associated with covert intelligence operations: scrambler phones, night-vision gunsights, infra-red signalers.” Hewitt (n 160).

163

The eight media organisations are listed under ‘Scope’, p. 10.

164

“Liu Xiaobo, a composer who had come over from Taiwan” should be: Hou Dejian. Liu Xiaobo was one of the ‘four gentlemen’ who, along with Hou Dejian, went on the hunger strike on June 2 and negotiated with the students to leave the square just before dawn on June 4.